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!BITRODUCTIOII
The close of this case brings to an.end the long parade
of evidence presented to the thirteen soleim Tribiinals r/hich
have sat in judgT:ient at Nurnberg. This avre-inspiring march
of documents and v-dtnesses began in November 19h^ before the
International Jiilitar^r Tribunal, only a fevr days short of
three years ago. In the course of a little more than these
three years, Allied investigators have filed for official
registration in the central document room of the courthouse,
more than 61,000 documents. The large majority of these
documents are "contemporaneous dociiments" vi/ritten by German
leaders or the assistants of German leaders during the Nazi
era itself. These contemporaneous records constitute the
unerasable, self-vn'itten history'" book concerning those men who
for so long clung together for better or worse, for richer or
poorer, in Hitler's Third Reich until their ill-fated union began
, to crack in the last months of the Nazi era in the face of comraon
^ defeat and the ir^^ending ^Treck of their booty-laden ship of
0
This grOTdng source book of history has been the backbone
of the Nurnberg story, ^That we say here, what the defendants
and the defense counsel have gaid here or will say here, and what
this Tribunal finally says here will be measured in ter::is of this
\ now indestructible record of Hitler's Third Reich. It could not
I be other^dse, for time itself can afford few, if any, better
gauges to a scientific inquiry into the role wiiich Individual men
played in the history of these tii.es than is already laid bare
before us in this contemporaneous source book,
n-n Germany itself, it is to this record that the true schblar,
knOT^ng that the Nazi liidtations on the process of inquiry have
been removed, looks for an understanding cf the unfortunate history
of Gerr.aany from 1933 to 19h$^ our words can add little to the
condeinnat-ion Y.'hich these contemporaneous records convey within
their four corners, and vra suggest that the explanations that
the defendants and their YO-tnesses have made are but a scant
apology for such condonaiation. One of the most distinguishing
aspects of this particular trial is that far more of the
^ conteTi^oraneous docuTiicntation has passed before the scrutiny of
this Tribiinal than before anj" of the other t/felve Tribunals
^ convened in TTurnberg, not excluding the International Military
Tribunal, in fact, when the International ililitary Tribunal
ceased taldng evidence in the surmior of 19l|6, only a small
fraction of this available, evidence had been uncovered from the
Jijyriad of places vfhere it laid buried in ruins or hidden away in
^ tho tons of papor work r.tiich reflootod tho business of these
tines. Indeed, if anjr substantial part of this newly discovered
evidence had been available before tho indictment ims filed Y.dth
tho international Military Tribunal in October 19k^, it is plain
that more than a few of uho defendants in this case ".Yould have
<
accounted for his individual responsibility in t}iat first great
trial. Like the findings in the judgment of the International
^ I.ilitary Tribunal, your findings upon the vast evidence in this
record vrill bo a significant factor ajnong those factors which
will finally reveal to all rianlcLnd tliat the leaders of nations,
just as the common citiziens of nations, may not, without a duo
accounting, commit evil upon manlcind at Yvill.
f
A sumi.iing up, the prosecution is anxious to observe th»
I3 utmost Gconoi^iy of words and means. The burdens which this trial
has imposed, on tho Tribunal and on counsel for the prosecution
and defense alike, have been heavy. On the part of the prosecution,
vju intend to embody our detailed analjreis of tho record, and our
suniiiation of the evidence as it relates to each individual defendant
in the briefs which we vfill file.
In this oral sur:ii-.iation, accordingly, wo do not propose to deal
*j
exhaustively iTith each charge of ilie indictment nor vd.th each
defendant. To undertake a full and detailed exposition of this
sort wouldj wa think, prolong this statement unnecessarily and
needlessly duplicate much of vrhat v.dll appear in our briefs.
Today vra shall attempt principally to emphasize the Ian of the
case and to suggest its application v.dth respect to these
defendants.
-3-
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COUNTS I and II
CRIUES AGAINST PSAGS
We shall discuss at this pointy the legal
questions presented in connection with Counts I and
II, relating to Crimes against Peace, First, we shall
indicate the difference between Counts I and II of the
t Indictment, Second, the question of whether planning,
preparation and initiation of aggressive war is separate
and distinct from the "waging" of aggressive war.
Third, what is embraced In the concept of "waging"
i aggressive war, as distinguished from participation
i in the planning and preparation thereof. Fourth, in
connection with the concept of waging of aggressive
war, we shall discuss the rela.tion of pa.rticipa.tion in
plunder and spoliation and slave labor as they relate
^ to Crimes against Peace, Fifth, we shall consider
whethar* the invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia come
within the definition of Grimes against Peace, and
what effect, if any, the absence of hostilities plays
in that connection. Sixth, we shall consider the
nature and effect of the defense raised, that these
defendants were engaged in preparation for a defensive
i war. In that connection, we shall discuss the effect
of Ordinance No. 7^
/
^eyepth, we shall analyze and review
briefly the decisions of the Nurnberg Tribunals, in
the Krupp, Far ben and High Command cases, as they
relate to Crimes against Peace, and finally, wo shall
indicate what appears to us to be the principles to be
applied in determining the guilt or innocence of the
-4-
defendants in this case under Counts I and Ii.
We have submitted a brief which discusses in'
some detail the legal questions indicated.
We propose in this oral argument to touch only
the highlights of these questions. In view of the
nature of the questions involved, we respectfully
invite the Tribunal to interrupt the Speaker at any
time to ask questions which the Tribunal, may consider
necessary to clarify any doubtful points,
^-2 22^ Count II
Count I cha.rges the commission of Crimes against
Peace, namely the participation in planning, prepara
tion, initiation and waging of wars of aggression.
Count II charges participation as leaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices, in a coru-
splracy to commit the foregoing.
Although some of the Military Tribunals in
Wurnberg have considered both of these Counts to be
one and the same thing, analysis will disclose that
they are not one and the same thing. We have dis
cussed this point in detail in our brief. In this
oral presentation, we desire to demonstrate the point
by referring to one or two cases.
The IMT, likewise, had two counts, charging
Crimes against Peace which were get up in the same
way. The counts of that Indictment were in the
reverse order to the counts in this case - that ig,
the IMT Count I was the "conspiracy" count, and
Count IX was the count charging "planning, preparation,
-5-
tinitiation and waging of War," In the Judgment of the
IMT, dealing with these specific counts, some of the
defendants were found guilty under the planning,
preparation and waging war count, but were acquitted
of the conspiracy count. Some were indicted only on
the count charging planning, preparation and yaging,
and were not indicted on the conspiracy count. If
the contention is correct that both counts are one and
the same thing, then it would be meaningless to find
a defendant guilty on one of the counts, and not
guilty on the other count. On its face, that is.
sufficient proof that the counts are Independent and
separate. The Judgment of the lUT, as we show in
more detail in our brief, very plainly indicates that
in its decision as to the Individual defendants, they
recognized and drew a distinction between the con-
spriacy count and the count charging participation
i
in the planning, preparation and waging of aggressive
war..
•9
A careful analysis of the HIT Judgment dlscloeea
that in the application of the facts to the respective
counts, they applied a different degree and quantum
of proof to convict for a conspiracy than they did
^ to convict on the count charging planning, preparation
I and waging of aggressive war. One reason for the
court adopting such a narrow construction of the con
cept of conspiracy was probably the fact that this
concept of conspiracy is foreign to Continental Law,
and hence it was given a very limited construction,
B^t, again, we emphasize the point that when the same
defendant whom the HJLT has acquitted of Count I, ig
^6-
IJ
found "by it to be guilty under Count II, then the
conclusion must be inescapable that the counts are
separate and distinct offenses in the legal sense^
Conspiracy, therefore, is to be considered separate
and apart from the count charging planning, prepara^
tlon, initiation and vaging of wars of aggression.
tween Waging W§rs
of ^S^esslpn and Participation in the
Control Council Law No. 10 defines Crimes against
Peace as:
j "»•«•# initiation of invasions of
other countries, and wars of aggres
sion in violation of international
laws and treaties; including, but
not limited to, planning, preparar-
tion, initiation or waging a war of
nggression, or a war in vlols,tlon
of international treaties, agree-
^ ments or assurances - or participa
tion in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accoraplishment of any of the
foregoing,"
*
The London Charter in section 6 contains the
same definition - in the alternative - planning, prepa
ration or waging. How, it la plain from the language
u
of Control Council Law No. 10, and the London Charter
^ that planning, preparation and initiation are separate
^ distinct offenses from waging, and that a convic
tion will lie for participating either in the planning,
preparation and Initiation, or in the waging. That
dlatinotion is made by the lUT with respect to the
Case of the defendant Doenltz, and the Tribunal
specifically stated there that Doenltz did not partici
pate in the planning, preparation or Initiation, but
-7-
did participate in waging, and upon that ground found
him guilty under Count II, as charged. Since the HIT
decision, the General Tribunal.in the French Zone of
Occupation, consisting of French, Belgian and Dutch
judges, rendered Judgment in the case of Hermann
This-Tribunal was exercising jurisdiction
*
under Control. Council Law No, 10, In its Judgment
^ it also drew the distinction between planning, prepa
ration and initiation of wars of aggression, and the
waging of such wars. In that case, Roechling was
^ charged on specific counts with, 1) having partici
pated in the preparation and planning of aggressive
^ war, and 2) participating in the waging of aggressive
war. The Judgment of the General Tribunal, which we
discuss in detail in our brief, acquitted Roechling
of the count charging him with participating in the
planning and preparation, but found him guiltj^ of th©
i count charging participation in the waging. The Mili
tary Tribunal in the I. G. Farben case also made a
similar distinction.
This, then, brings us to the problem of what is
embraced in the concept of "waging" aggressive war.
A
"Waging^' Aggressive
J As a general principle of criminal responsibility,
it is necessary to establish that a defendant su^
stantially participated in a criminal act, and that
such participation was accompanied by criminal intent -
or to state it another way, the state of mind of the
defendant which accompanied hie activity, must be euch
. that it can be adduced that he had knowledge or is
-8-
chargeable vjlth knowledge of the criminal character
of his activity.
Since we maintain that waging is an offense
separate and distinct from preparation, planning and
initiation, it is incumbent upon us to define, at least
of this case, the extent of the concept
of waging,
If there is knowledge on the part of a defendant
that the initiation of a particular war is illegal -
that is, that it is aggressive - and he then partici
pates in a substantial way in waging such war (and we
stress the word "substantial"), _then we say, that
constitutes the v^aging of aggressive war. To illus
trate our point: a person may have knowledge of the
planning and preparation of wars of aggression, but
he does not participate in a substantial enough manner
In such planning and preparation which would be
sufficient to hold him criminally responsible. Yet,
when possessed of such knowledge whether acquired
"before or after a particular aggression, any substantial
participation by him thereafter,constitutes waging of
aggressive war -Ithln the meaning of control Council
Law No. 10.
The Pa.t-ben Tribunal undertook to discuss the con
cept Of -iwagingi. in relation to the activities of the
defendants in that case. That Tribunal posed the
problem as follows: (p, gl)
1 offense under international
^ oitizen of a state that hasa.uncned an aggressive attack on another
coUii ry^ to support and .aid such war
ei-orts ©f his country, or Is liabillt^^
'O be limited to those who are responsible
-9-
for the formulation and execution
of the policies that result in the
Carrying-on of such a war?"
The Tribunal in trying to prescribe the limits
of the class of persons who are embraced within the
concept of waging, • stated; (p. 61)
^ ."to depart from the concept that
only major war criminals - that is,
those persons in the political,
military^ and industrial fields,
for example, who are responsible
for the formulation and execution
of policies, may be held liable for
waging wars of aggression, would
lead far afield. * * * To say that
the Government of Germany was
guilty of waging aggressive war,
but not the men who were in fact
the Government and whose minds con
ceived the planning and perfected
its execution, would be an absurdity."
The Tribunal then construed the BIT decision as
having fixed the standard of participation: (p. 63)
II-K- ^ high among those who .
^ lead their country into the war,"
The Tribunal concluded that the Farben defendants were:
II*** not high public officials in
« the civil Government, nor high mili
tary officers. Their participation
was that of followers, and not
leadersc"
What troubled the Tribunal in the ^rben case,
was the extent of the standard dealing with waging war,
so as not to include within its scope the ordinary
^ German, The Tribunal said: (p, 64)
i
"We cannot say that a private citizen
shall be placed in the position of
being compelled to determine in the
heat of war, whether his Government
is right or wrong, or if it starts
right ^ when it turns wrong. We
would not require the citizen, at the
risk of becoming a criminal under the
rules of international justice, to
deu3de that his country has become
an aggressor, and that he must lay
aside his patriotism, the loyalty
-10-
T
to his homeland, and the defense of
his own fireside, at the rish of "being
adjudged guilty of Grimes against
Peace on the one hand, . or of "becoming
a traitor to his country on the other
if he makes an erroneous decision
"based upon facts of t^hich he has 'but
a vague knowledge*"
In endeavoring to find the mark dividing the guilty
4
from the innocent, insofar as responBibility for waging
of aggressive war is concerned, the Farben Tribunal
' stated that the line of demarcation did not stop with
the defendants who were tried befor'e the B^T, The
standard of the IMT was construed by the Farben Tribunal
as he.ving been set: (p. 64)
Y « •» beloyr the planners and leaders
I such as Goerir.g, Hess, von Rl'bbentrop,
Rosenberg, Keitel, Frick, Funk, Doenitz,
Raeder, Jodl, Seyss-Inquart and von
Neurath, * « * n
•who were found guilty of the waging of aggressive war,
and,
<t ii« « * above those whose participation
was less, and whose activity took the
form of neither planning nor guiding
their nation in its aggressive ambi-
^ tion."
As we have indicated, the Farben case dealt with
private cltlzensi not high governmental officials*
* The test which we suggest be applied to the defen
dants in this case, in connection with "waging",
N •
^ eliminates the fears indicated by the Farben Tribunal,
)
The defendants here charged were all high officials of
the Government possessed with unique knowledge unavail
able to private citizens* Hence, the area of responsi
bility in this case is limited to high officials of the
Government who had knowledge of the planning and prepara
tion for some or all of the aggressions, and whose
participation after the initiation thereof, was sub
stantial* .
-11-
In connection with the concept of ^waging", we
desire to call attention to another factor which Is
embraced In this concept. The plunder of property
In occupied countries is charged separately as a
!i Wrir Crlme_, and a Crime against Humanity, The Initia
tion and utilization of slave labor is separately
j charged as a War Crime and a Crime against Humanity -
But there are other aspects of plunder and spoliation,
and slave labor, which play a part in Crimes against
Peace, relating to the waging of aggressive war,
^hen a defendant has knowledge that an aggressive
war has been initiated, and that the plan for waging
of such war includes the utilization of the economy
and industry of occupied countries, and the utiliza
tion of the manpower of such occupied countries, then
* his substantial participation in the execution of
these features of the program, constitutes,
I
^ participation in waging wars of aggression. Now,
the distinction between performing- activities in
these fields, ^vhich are War Crimes and Crimes against
, Humanity, and participation in these activities which
constitute waging of wars of aggression, lies In the
fact of Knowledge that these programs are intended as
/ part of the plans for waging wars of aggression. To
Illustrate - plunder and spoliation of property, per
ae, constitutes a War Crime and Cf^ime against Humanity,
Wlien, In add.ltinn to participating in the act of
plunder Itself, there is evidence that this partici
pation was a-ccompanied by knowledge that the property
Was to be j^li^r^dered and spoliated pursuant to a plan
or program to more effectively wage the aggressive wars,
-12-
9then as to euch defendant, the crime of "waging"-*
is made out.
Another factual Illustration will perhaps moke
this i:>oint cleaver. In connection with the spoliation
charges against Russia, the Defense have taken the
position that as a matter of law, it is not a violation
of the Hague Regulations to plunder Russian property,
since such property is of a special character, and _
not of the kind dealt with in the Hague Conventions.
The Prosecution vigorously contests this contention.
But if such contention is sustained, then, of course,
there would be no War Crimes or Crimes against Humanity
of plunder and spoliation as to Russia. Now, assuming,
for argument's sake onlj, that with respect to War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity there is no criminal
responsibility for' the spoliation acts in Russia, it
is clear from the evidence, that the spoliation activities
in Russia,wejr^ integral parts of the plans for yraglng
aggressive war, both against Russia and the other
Allied countries, and any defendant who had knowledge
of and substantially contributed to the planned
aggression against Russia, ond who had knowledge of
and substantially contributed to the plans to plunder
and spoliate Russian Industry for purposes of enabling
the German war machine to wage aggressive v;ar, is.
guilty of the crime of participation in bhe waging of
aggressive war.
There Is another aspect of "waging" that we should
like to discuss. The evidence as to' some defendants
shows substantial participation in the planning to use
Russian industry and manpo"^er as an instrument for
the strengthening of the German military machine for
-13-
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the continued vjaging of war. Assuming, ho?reverj
cil'guendo, thehe were no pal'tloipa.tion in the Buesi^
spoliation as distinguished from the planning^ vet
participation in such planning would constitute parti
cipation in waging aggressive war against England,
France, Holland, Belgium, etc, - for the planning to
use the resources and manpower of Russia, was directly
connected with the plans for fu"»^ther waging of war
against -i^ngland and the others mentioned.
.We have referred to the Judgment of the General
Triounal in the French Zone in the Roechling case,
and have pointed out that the. Tribunal, consisting
of French, Belgian and Dutch Judges, found the
defendant guilty of, "waging", but acquitted him of
participating in the planning, preparation and initia
tion of aggressive war. We have discussed in our
"brief in some detail the facts upon which the French
Tribunal "based its decision which found the defendant
guilty of "waging", and for present purposes it would
"be sufficient to note that Roechling's activities for
which he was convicted for "waging", is related to
the tahe-oer and utilization of industry, and property
of occupied countries for the pu.rpose of waging wars
of aggression, Roechllngs positions and activities
were considerably less significant than that of these
defendants,
Austria and Czechoslovakia
In connection with Crimes against Peace, consid
eration of the legal effect of the activities of
Germany, and of these defendants, in relation to
-1^
Austria ana Czechoslovakia.i is necessary. From the
legal aspect, we see the problem to "be thisJ Were
the invasions of Austria and Czechoslovakia, y/hpre
no hostilities actually occurred, Crimes against
Peace? Does the fact that there was no physical
resistance by Austria or Czechoslovakia in the form
of sending an army into the field to resist the German
invasion, make this invasion permissible under inter
national law?
The position of the prosecution is that if the
invasion is unlawful, it does not become lawful be
cause the military force of the invading poorer was
so superior that the occupied power felt it useless,
in the military sense, to resist.
and
The moral problem/the legal proble^i, here involved.
relates to the use of force as an instrument of national
policy. It Is the exercise of such force on another
Government, compelling the latter Government to yield
to the superior force, which constitutes the crime,
We Cannot see, as a matter of principle, tha.t it can
make any difference whether the 'Government yields after
a battle, or before a battle, when from the military
point of view, it is known that actual resistance can
serve no useful purpose.
The JKT considered that point, and stated: (p.194)
"It was contended before the Tribunal
that the annexation of Austteia v^as
Justified by the strong desire ex
pressed in many quarters for the union
of Austria and Germany; and that
in the result, the objective was
achieved v^jithout bloodshed. These
matters, even if true, are really
immaterial, for the facts plainly
-15-
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prove that the methods employed to
•achieve the objective, were those-of
an aggressor. The ultimate factor
was the armed might of Germany
ready to be used if any resistance
wa.s encountered."
The IliT, in discussing the guilt of von Schlrach,
s tat 6 d •
"von Schlrach ^ is charged
^ ^ -a- only with the commission of
Crimes against Humanity. As has
already been seen, Austria was
occupied pursuant to a. common plan
of aggression. Its occupation is,
therefore, a 'crime within the jur
isdiction of the Tribunal' as that
term is used in Article C of the
Charter, "
The Tribunal then held that persecution on
political, racial or religious grounds in connestion
with the occupation of Austria, constituted a Crime
against Humanity under the Charter, This holding is
significant when we recall that the Tribunal held
that: (p. 254) •
IM.ll
"To constitute Crimes against .•flji
Humanity, the acts relied on before
the outbreak of ws.r must have been
in execution of, or in connection
with, any crime within the jurla-
dlction of the Tribunal. ^ The
Tribunal, therefore, cannot make a
general declaration that the acts
befor?"1939 we-^e Crimes against
Humanity within the meaning of the
Charter."
We emphasize the wordg "general declaration," These
holdings of the HIT plainly indicate that it is not
a requisite for actual hostilities to take place in
order to support a finding that an aggressive act
or an invasion in violation of international treaties
has occurred. If the BIT had thought that the occupa
tion of Austria was lawful, then it would have been
bound to hold that Crimes against Humanity could not#
in the legal sense, have been committed in Austria.
-X6-
Its holc.in.2 v^as directly to the contrary*
.It should be x^ointed out in thla oonnection^
that ^the Indictment lodged before the- JliT did not
charge the" invasion of Austria was an aggressive war
(Count II of the im, Vol. I, Trial of the Major
War Criminals, at p. 42). The IMT made special ref
erence to that point when it discussed the guilt of
of Kaltenbrunner, and stated:
"The Anschluss, although it was
an agpjressive act, is not charged
as an aggressive war."
In this Indictment, we have specifically charged
that the invasion against Austria was an invasion
and of aggression in violation of international
laws and treaties. We have then in this case a charge
which was not made against any of the defendants,
before the UIT. The findings of the II.!iT that the
invasion of Austria was an aggressive act, is binding
on this Tribunal- In view of the specific charge
in the Indictment that this particular activity is
an lnva.".ion and a war of aggression in violation of
International treaties, a specific finding is required
as to each of the defendants who are here charged
with responsibility for participation in the iDlannlng
and preparation for the Invasion of Austria.
Czechoslovakia presents a slightly different
problem. There are two factual phases dealing with
the situation in Czechoslovakia: 1) the Sudetenland
which was occupied under the Munich Agreement, and
2) Bohemia and Moravia, which was occupied on 15
Marc^ 1939 in violation of the Munich Agreement, and
in violation of international law generally.
-17^
7As to the occupation of; Bohemia and Moravia,,
the findings of the BIT are that:, (p, 334)
"Bohemia and Moravia \*?ere occupied
'by military force, Hacha's consent
o'b,ta.i^®^ as it wag duress, could
hof'be considered as; justifying the
occupatiiDn. f k The occupation of
Bohemia and Moravia must, therefore,,
he considered as a military occupa
tion covered by the rules of warf.are,"
t'
jV. •
Again, this indicates that if the invasion is
aggressive or in viola.tion of interna-tional treaties
or assurances, it is a Crime against Peace within
the meaning of the Control Council Law, regardless
of whether hostilities actually occurred, A contrary''
holding would substitute force as the standard of
justice, rather than the sanctity of international
obligations, and a small or weak nation which lacks
the military force to resist the powerful a,ggressor,
would have no protection under international law.
International law cannot rest on ajiy such imiaoral
foundation.
As to the Sudetenland, the argument is made that
the occupation of that part of Czechoslova.kia was
lawful, since it was pursuant to the Munich Pact.
The BIT, after reciting the facts in connection with
the planning of aggression against Czechoslovakia,
stated: (p, 196)
"These facts demonstrate that the
occupation of Czechoslovakia had been
planned in detail long befo-'^e the
Munich conferences. * * The plan
was modified in some respects after
the Munich conferences, but the fact
that the plan existed in such exact
detail and was couched in such w'ar-
like language, indicates a calculated
design to resort to force,"
-18-
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The „.uriich hc:yeeiiient insgf^ as Germany was
concerned was a "diplomatic" operation, carried out
in execution of the plan to take all of Czechoslovakia
by forge» We dg not, we submit, have to consider
any theoretical question under international law as
to whether occupation of a country under a formal
license of another x^ower, or with the formal consent
of another loower, is legal under international law»
We need go no further than a consideration of the
facts of the Munich Agreement, In view of the flnd«.
ings of the BilT that it was concluded as an alterna^
tive to the immediate execution of the aggressive
plans of Germany to occupy Czechoslovakia, it does
not carry with it the same legal effect as an agree
ment carries which is freely negotiated, without
force or coercion. In our brief dealing with the
legal princlxDles applicable to plunder and si^oliation
and War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity we discuss
the legal problems of Czechoslovakia in some detail,
and for a further consideration of the question, we
respectfully refer the Tribunal to that brief.
We have mentioned the findings of the B.-IT to the
effect that Austria and Czechoslovakia we'ce aggressive
acts, and to the findings that certain wars were
aggressive wars. We believe this an appropriate point
to consider the effect of those findings. Ordinance
No, V provides that:
"The determinations of the lliH! that
invasions and aggressive acts, aggres
sive wars, crimes, at"^ocities or
inhuman acts were planned or occurred,
shall be binding on the Tribunals
established hereunder and shall not
be questioned except insofar as parti
cipation therein or knowledge thef^eof
-la.
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of any •particular' person may "be con
cerned* . Statements of the Inter
national Military Tribunal in the
Judgment in Case No, 1 shall consti
tute proof of the facts stated, in
the absence of substantial new
evidence to the contrary-*"
/
A number of the defendants have attempted to
show that some of the acts found aggressive by the
were not aggressive in fact. Of course, under
Ordinance No;. 7 this avenue is not open to them.
The ordinance provides that "determinations of the
IMT that invasions and aggressive acts, aggressive
wars" took place are binding. But the defendants
may argue that they had no knowledge that the
invasion, for example of the USSR, was aggressive,
and that on the contrary they thought Germany's
attack was in fact a defensive war. This is a
fashionable line of argument nowadays, but it is
and
not new. The same argument/was made before "ttie IMT,
Concerning that argument the evidence there sub
mitted, the IMT said:
"It was contended for the defendants
that the attack upon the USSR "-asjustified because the Soviet Union
was contemplating an attack upon
Germany, and making preparations to
that end, It is Impossible to be
lieve that this view was ever
honestly entertained,"
The evidence submitted in this case is to a similar
effect and has not stood up under cross examination.
The testimony of General von Haider, Chief of Staff,
called as a defense witness on this point, is a
striking example of the shallowness of this proof.
We submit that, quite as in the E-^T case "it is im
possible t» believe that this view was ever honestly
entertained" by any of these defendants.
-SO-
Distinguishing the Krupp_^ iarben_^ and
High Command Cases.
XiQ come, now, to a consideration of the cases
which have, heretofore, "been decided by the Military
Tribunals at Nurnberg, which deal with the legal
questions involving the interpretation and application
of the Control Council Law No, 10 definition of Crimes
against Peace.
In the case-by-case application of the principles
announced by the IMT, and those underlying Control
Council Law No. 10, relating to Crimes against Peace,
the Military Tribunals at Nurnberg have excluded certain
types of officials and persons and certain activities
from the area of responsibility for this crime. Thus,
in the Krupp case, the Tribunal held that private
citizens who were enge^ed in producing munitions for
war, could not be charged with responsibility for
participating in the planning, preparation, initiation
or wa-lng of aggressive war, when there was no showing
that such private persons had any substantial connection
with, or close relationship to, the officials of the
G-overnment who were engaged In such planning, prepara
tion, initiation or waging. Thus, Judge Anderson, In
his Special Concurring Opinion in that case, stated;
"The twelve defendants were non-combatants
engaged as private citizens in the conduct of
a private enterprise producing, among other
things, armaments for profit,*** If the manu
facture and sale of armaments for profit can
be regarded as preparation for war in a crimi
nal sense, At_can_only be_8o in_cora-
£l3.cj^t^ with_the_plans_of lome_agency ca2abl_e
o,f_plannj.n£,_initiating and waging_war_^"_
-23..
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Likev/ise, In the case involving the defendants of
Tribunal held that they, too, were
privs.te citizens who were not shown to have the degree
of connection with high Government officials of a
character to warrant a finding that their participation
in rearmament was with the knowledge of its criminal
purpose. Thus, the Tribunal in the Farben case, sta.ted:
"In this case, we are faxed with the problem
determining the guilt or the Innocence with
respect to the waging of aggressive v/ar on the
< part of men of industry who were not makers
of policy, but who supported their Government
during the period of rearmament, and who con
tinued to serve that Government in the waging
^ of v/ar. *** The defendants now before us, are
not high Government officials in the Civil
Government, nor high military officials. Their
participation was that of followers, and not
leaders."
t/G think it apparent tha.t in the fa.ctual situations
involving Krupp and Farben, the decisive fact was that
the defendants were private citizens not occupying
hlgh Government or military office. This fact, is the
substantial difference between those cases and the
case at bar»
The Military Tribunal in the case known as the
Case_!;_, decided 28 October 1948, again
ai^plied the IMT principles and the st-tutory defini
tion of Crimes against Peace to the particular facts
of that case, which involved Commanders and Staff
Officers, below the policy level. The particular mili
tary officials involved, v/ere held by the Tribunal to be
Commanders and Staff Officers "below the policy level",
and the Tribunal was of the opinion that such officers;
(p.38)
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in planning campaigns, preparing means for
carrying them out, moving against a country _on
orders, and fighting a, war* after it has been
instituted "
were not participating in the X->lanning, preparation,
initiation or waging of wer*.- The decision of the
Military Tribunal in the High Command case was nothing-
more than the application of legal principles to a
given factual situation, namely the authority and
activities of a paEt^cular_group_of Military Commanders
and Staff Officers, This is apparent from the following
reference in the Tribunal's Judgment: (p-36)
''The Individual soldier or officer
policy level, is then the policy makers .
ment, finding himself as he —.-tj—dl_sc_ipline_whi_ch_i_s ne^os_sar^,_a^4_^— £ ———
military orga.nizatlon,"'*'
In the ca,ses discussed, there will necessarily
apx^ear dicta both pro and con. This is farailia.r Judicial
technique in rationalizing a learticular Judgment. The
point we make is that the three cases referred to,
naiaely, Krupp, Farben and the High Command,, constitute
factual situations of a special nature, and as to thos
factual situations, the Tribunal found that the persons
and activities there Involved did not come within the
scoi:)e of criminal responsibility for Crimes
Peace.
The Law still is loft at the stage where it must
be develoiaed by a case-to-oase process of inclusion
and exclusion before it can be sufficiently crystallized
into a more definite pattern which identifies with
greater certainty the positions and activities coming
within its prohibition.
-23-
2
Al."
: •
The iDolnt we maJce, is that the three factual
situations which the Military Tribunals at Nurnberg had
before them for consideration with re-pect to Crimes
against Peace, are, substantially different from the factual
situations V/hich arc present in this case. The defenda.nts
hero, however, both by virtue of their high govern
ments,! position and their functional activities, are
parallel to the defendfjits found guilty by the IliT,
What, then, shall we use as a guide in applying to
the facts in this case the principle that aggressive
war is criminal?
The IMT has stated that the supreme International
crime is the commission of Crimes against Peace. The
Krupp ca,se recognized that basic moral concept under
lying this crime, and stated;
II # 'ti* Aggressive war is the supreme crime, and
no penaltris too severe for those rrho ejr-e re
sponsible for it."
*Wc further have the observation of the IMT, that;
"Hitler could not malie sggrossive war by himself.
He had to have the cooperation of sta.tesmen,
m?Utarrioad^ diplomats and businessmen."
What we are faced with here, is recognition in
international law of a, moral principle# coupled with
repeated assurances that the nainteneince of this moral
principle is necessary for the preserva,tion of clviliza
tion. If in application this principle is too nariowly
aiDpliedjit becomes a pious hope, and not an instrument
of Justice for v/hich the responsible persons must
ansv/er.
4-,
•n,. persons responsibly ^It is not true that the only 1 fop
pTitlcr s.nd the •t;;b'=i
the e^gressive vjbjts of G-ermanyj ^
ntv W It V,
teen defendants who were found gui-i- J ^uns
A nil reason-to say that th^contrary to experience and to aiJ- "-ne
,-TV.ich C-^3rmany built +.
treraendous military organization wn t,o
j 4-n fhe
prepojre for aggressive wa.r and to > o -i-
work of only Hitler and those thirteen persons, it
unrealistic,, and contrary to everytiay ® ^ to
that thirteen persons cen mobilise a population of qo
million, and organize exi industrial economy ai. over
. . ^ ^ 4-c. the economy of con-
a period of yesns, and integrate
4 war. Justicequered countries to wage aggressive
v,t "before the IMT;Jaclcson expressed the same tnou^^nt.
(p. 104, Vol. II, liil)
"This war gd not J^^gng '^perlod of '^une^^TOd®^
end prepared for over a rnv^y worldWith no snail skill o^^^fehrati^rand''^ '^
perhaps never seen sucn a ^ npooip
stimulation of the energiesthat which enabled &erma^ 2
v/as defeated, disarmed,^ dominate
oomo so near carrying out 1
Europe. \/hatever else ve mr..yv/nat i a*^ pphio-,",^
' . authors of this war, they .^1^ ^achievewere ^nlza ion," and our
a s-cupenduous worlc in orga^^
first task is to ^3. fGllow-conspirators
these defendants and tnenprepared rnd incited Germany to go to war.
Common 3£nov.;ledge of modern Government should be enough
to demonstrate that Ribbentrop was not the whole Foreign
Office. Goering was not the entire Four Year Plan,
Goebbela was not the entire propaganda machine. Himmler
was not the entire SS. >i.nd Hitler was not the whole
government in action, The defendants in this case are the
high governmenta.l officials who were partners of and In-
dispens£;Dle supplements to Ribbentrop, Goering, Goebbels,
Himmler and Hitler, so that the tremendous military
machine which they were building in preparation for the
-25-
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a£C£^resslve eiid. the wa-rcing of such wais,, could be
a.ocomplished.
If, as Former Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson,
(25 Foreign Affair_s 179 (Januexy 1947)) states:
"The centra.1 moral pr£blem is_war_-_and_not_i;ts_
meTh£d£,]][
we do not come to grips with the heart of the problem by
giving the words of Control Council Law No.10 a restrictive
intoi-pretation, that is not justified by the langu^^e nor
by the spirit end intent of the law. Such restrictive
intori.->retation disregards the factual situation which
the legislators had in mind at the time.
We call attention again to paragraph 2 of article II
of Control Council Law No.10, which provides that a
person is deemed to have committed a Crime against Peace if;
ti -fr -it he was (a) a principle or (b) was en
accessory to the commission of any such crime or
ordered or abetted the sernie or (c) took a
sentinp' pert therein or (d) was c^onnected y/ith
•olans or'enterprises involving its commission
'or (e) was a member of any organization or
vroup connected with the commission of any such
Srirae or (f) with reference
if he held a high political, or mlliteny(includin-^ G-eneral Staff) position in Germany
or in one^f its Allies, oo-belligorents or
satellites or held high position
financial, industrial or economic life oi c.ny
such country."
Now, we respectfully suggest, that this Tribuna.1,
being a creature of, and owing its existence to. the
authority of the Control Council Law, is-
required to give to that statute an interpretation con-,
sistent with its legislative intent. That is to say, the
standards laid dovm in paragraph 2 of article II, are
statutory provisions, aJid the court is bound to apply
-26-
the provisions of that statute, according to its plain
lanuage._ A Tribunal cannot, under the guise of interpreta
tion of a particular statute, set up its ovm standards
of criminal responsibility. The provisions state that
a person holding high position in the civil, military
or industrial life in {iermany is, if he taices a con
senting part, guilty of the commission of Crimes against
Peace.
It appears to us that this statutory standard hsvs
not alnaye been applied in accordance with its unmis
takable language.
There is a tendency to judge these defendrnts
according to the standards of public life in the executive
branch of the G-overnoents of the United States, Englmd,
and other Democratic countries. The system of government
\
Instituted by the Third Reich wa.s based on politica.l and
legal considerations of a different nature. The division
of le;.,islG,tive, judicial and executive power, which we
know, wa.s done away with and lodged in one department of
the G-overnment and rationalized under the concept of the
Fuehrer princliDle. All of these defendants \villingly
joined that political system and that Government, knovring
that a different principle of responsibility for govorn-
ment action vras the standard of their system. They volun
tarily joined the Government of Hitler, and exercised the
legislative, executive and judicial pov;er so concentrated,
in the Government offices in which they became associated.
Did they not then, in plain and simple language, sanction,
approve and participate in the force and terror upon
-27-
which the.t system vie.s based and mainta-ined?
Can they now say that they, cabinet members, mini
sterial secretaries or government officials on the same
level, are not to be held responsible because the final
overaJ.1 decision ^vas at the Fuehrer level?
ICCERNEH's defense is a good example of this point* He
joined up ivith G-oering early in 1926 and when G-oering was
first elected to the Reichstag in 1928, severed
his private business connections to devote his full time
to G-oering. From the beginning of the Nazi seizure of
power, he becrjne his closest associate. He was to
G-oering what Hess v;as to Hitler. He was at G-oering's side
through the successive stages of terror whereby the power
seized, was extended and maintained. He was his chief
deputy in the Four Year Plan. He says now, that although
he was at a high governmental level, he cannot be held
responsible for the genera.1 policy of the G-overnment v/hich
led to war, notwithstanding his participation in the
execution of that policy. Foi" ho argues, that under tne
Fuehrer principle •• (and he ashe for a litere.1 inter
pretation and application of that principle) only G-oei'ing
can be held responsible for the tremendous job of the
Four Year Plan which did enable G-ormany to wage the
aggressive wars. Only Goering, he says, could make the
bp,slo decision - and hence only ho should be held
answerable.
It is not, vre submit, a realistic approach to the
factual' situation relating to the Government of the
Third Reich to undertake to define the precise areas of
.-28.
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authority between G-oering end ICOEFd^ER. Kor is it a
realistic approach to undertalce to define the precise
area of authority between Hibbentrop and v/er-zsaecherj
between Goebbels end Dietrich; between Prich and Stuckart;
betvjeen Himmler and Berger or Schellenberg. The inte±''nal
Jurisdictional divisions which the Hitler Government set
up to more effectively carry out the planning, prepara.-
tion end vja^c;ing of aggressive war, cannot, in a realistic
closely
sense, be broken down so as to apportion/within these
sectors and levels, the varying degrees of responsibility,
Y/e think it enough if the evidence shows that epch defendant
in . . j. j 4
knov;ingly took a consenting part/end pexticlpated in a
substantial way in the criminal activities charged. It is
enough that ea«h of these defendants operated at a high
level in the same fields of activity that the principal
defendr'Jits in the IMT case operated and substantially
contributed to the success or failure of the program.
A functional comparison with the positions and
activities of the defendants in the IMT and the defendants
in this case, will disclose the parallel between the two
oases. The simple test to be applied to these defendants
is this; V/as there substantia.l paa '^ticipation by these
defendants in the preparation, planning, initiation or
waging of aggressive war, and was such participation had
with knowledge of the fact that the policy in which they
were engaged in, had as its basis the use of force as an
instrument of national policy?
An analogy of these defendants in connection with the
Crime sg-alnst Peace to the defendants convicted by the IMT
will now follow.
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The culpability of the defendants "^eizsaecker, roeriuann, Ritter
and Veesenmayer for crimes against the peace is a part of, or
essential supplement to, the culpable conduct of certain defendants
convicted on the aggressive i^ar count before the E'lT* 'T'e shall
draw some parallels between parts of the evidence in this case
and the findings of the concerning the criminal conduct of
von Ribbentrop, von Neurath, Seyss-Inquart and Rrick, all defendants
convicted by the HIT-
First let us take the activities of the defendants ''eizsaecker
and 'Toermann» •7e find these activities are comparable to or
extensions of the conduct of Ribbentrop and TJeurath. Ribbentrop
and Neurath v:ere found guilty under both the conspiracy and aggress"
war counts by the HIT. At the time of the aggressive act against
Austria in March 1938, Neurath once again took charge of the Foreign
Office for the duration of the action against Austria, even though
Ribbentrop had been appointed Neurath's successor. During this
interregnum "^Teizsaecker remained chief of the Political Division.
The HiT held that Neurath:
"took charge of the Foreign Office at the time of the
occupation of Austria, assured the British iVtnbassador
that this had not been caused by a German ultimatum, and
informed the Czechoslovakian Minister that Germany
intended to abide by its arbitration convention with
Czechoslovakia." (p.33U)*
"'."'eizsaecker shares responsibility for the formulation of the assurr ic
which Neurath gave to the Czechs and in the preparation of the
official communique containing the Nazi pretext "justifying" the
Anschluss. This communique was made before German troops went
into action against Austria.
'Tithin a few days after the success of Germany's first aggressiv
act, 'Toizsaecker was promoted from Chief of the Political Division tc
the position of State Secretary of Ribbentrop, the new Foreign Minis-^
Ribbentrop needed and used the capacity and suavity of the experience
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"Teizsaecker and of defendant 'Joermann^ the experienced Under
secretary, who succeeded 'Teizsaecker as Chief of the Political
Division. Tfeizsaeckor and 'Toormnn were head over heels in the
niachinations connected with Gen/iai^'s next aggressive act against
CzechoslovalcLa - and, indeed, in the iiianeuvers of aggression fron
there on until the,last aggression had been launched.
The KIT'S findings as to von Ribbentrop's participation in
'k.
the aggressive plans against Czechoslovakia (pp.285-286, K'T Vol.l)
can be applied to the defendant Tfeizsaeckor almost word for word
with vers'" little alteration. The niT held that von Ribbentrop
"participated in the aggressive plans against Czechoslovakia".
So did ^eizsaeckor. The BIT held that von Ribbentrop "participated
in a conference for the purpose of obtaining Hungarian support in
*
the event of a -.^ar with Czochoslovald-a". So did the defendant
^Teizsaecker. The IBT found that after the Tunich Pact the defendant
Ribbentrop "continued to bring diplomatic prcssiire with the object
" of occupying the remainder of Czechoslovakia". So did tlie defendant
TTeizsacckor. The BIT found that Ribbentrop -was instrujiental "in
V
inducing the Slovaks to proclaim their indepGndonco"• So was the
defendant 'Toizsaecker. Both Ribbentrop and the defendant Tfoizsaecker
iTcre "present at the conferences of ll|.-l5 iihrch 1939j ^ v-iiich Hitler
by threats of invasion counselled Hacha to consent to the Gorman
occupation of Czechoslovakia", h'hen, finally, the defendant
* Ribbentrop was in Prague for the "celebration", the defendant
"j'oizsaockor reiaaincd in Berlin in charge of the Foreign Office.
0 There he informed foreign diplomats that the Czochoslovakian affair
was a fait accompli and that Gornany would not accept any protest.
Bo submit that there is a strilcLng interrelation, and often
almost identity, between the conduct and the guilt of Ribbentrop and
the defendant 'Toizsaecker in the aggression against Czechoslovakia.
It is no more striking, ho-i^icvor, than tlie interrelation of their
activities in the aggression against Poland. The K.'.T held that
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Ribbontrop "played a particularly significant role in the diplomtic
activities vrhich led up to the attack on Poland". So did 'TcizsaGckcr.
The BIT fovind the defendant Ribbontrop discussed "the Gor;nan
donands Tfith rospoct to Danzig and the Polish Corridor T.dth the
British Ambassador during the period of 2$ to 30 August 1939".
ITcizsaeckcr discussed the same question ivith Ambassador Henderson
longer period of time,
and Ambassador Coulondre for a still / The BIT found that it ira-s
an official German policy to "attempt to induce the British to
abandon their guarantee to the Polos". Concerning the discussions
on these questions, both Ribbontrop and "oizsaccker "did not enter
^ them in good faith in an attempt to roach settlement of the
difficulties between Gemany and Poland". •Teizsaccker cabled the
^ defendant Veoscniaajrer that discussions with the Poles should be
continued in such a v/ay so that the failure of a pacific
Bottlemont could be blamed upon the Poles (Exh.l73j 17i>5 176).
It is a little late in the day for '"oizsaeckor to declare that ho
did not identify his Tdll with the aggression of Hitler's Third
Reich.
The correlative nature of the conduct of Ribbontrop and
••Toiasaocker continued vrLth respect to the aggressive acts against
Norway, Denmark and the Low Countries. The BIT iicld that
"Ribbontrop was advised in advance of the attack" and that
Ribbontrop "prepared the official Foreign Office memoranda
attempting to Justif^^ these aggressive actions". 'Toiasaockor, for
his pert, attempted to induce the Norvrogian, Danish and Belgian
' governments to capitulate witfiout resistance in numerous conferences
with foreign officials of those countries. The documents sho\T
that the tcanr-vork of Ribbontrop and Toizsacckcr continued vath
respect to the aggressive acts against the Balkan countries and
the Soviet Union.
The defendant "'^oernann participated substantially in all
aggressive acts beginnir^' "".vith Czechoslovakia. Ho was Chief of
-32.
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the Political Division^ the vcr^ heart oj? the Gorhian Foreign Office.
In this position ho nocossarily gave intimate and significant
support to the acts of Ribbentrop and h''oizsaockor. It is striking
to compare his function in tlio Foreign Office "VTith the BIT
findings concerning the defendant prick's work in crir.ies against
peace, h'ith rospoct to Frick the IIT stated;
**• "performing his allotted duties, Frick devised an
administrative organization in accordance vdth wartime
standards. According to his ovm statement this was
actually put into operation after Germany decided to
adopt a policy of war." (Vol.I, p.299).
According to an official German document spelling out the organizatior
^ of the German Foreign Office, 'Vocrmann's Political Division hold;
"... the position of a central agency, which is to
observe current events abroad and to determine foreign
0 policy according to the piaehror's intention ..." (Pros.
Sxh.3658).
he have already noted that the B'T found that Ribbentrop T/as
"instrumental in inducing the Slovaks to proclaim tlieir independence".
'Toormann, in an official memoranda, expounded the rationale of
' securing an independent Czechoslovakia pursuant to Germar^/'s plans
for expansion to the east. "Tocrmann wrote:
"An independent Slovakia would be a weak political
organism and hence v/^ould lend "tdie best assistance to the
German need for advance and settling space in the East.
Point of least resista,ncc in the East." (Pros.Exli. 98).
The I'T found that Ribbentrop used the Sudeten question as a
moans:
"... T/hich night serve as an excuse for the attack
which Gonaany was planning against Czechoslovakia*"
(Vol.1, p.286)
r
•^o ask the Tribunal to coto carefully what ""ocnnann was thinking and
counselling concerning tlic Sudeten mncuvering and how carefully he
advised with respect to the skilful timing of events. ^Tocrmann
developed the follordng plan in his memorandum of 19 September I938
(Pros.Exh.C-385):
-3.3-
"As to "ttie fate of the rest of Czechoslovakia, of the
many possibilities ranging from simple annexation to
full national independence Tdth or T.dtliout an
international guarantee, the most far-reaching
possibility, namely that of an annexation is out of
the question for the time being, since othendse there
Tfould be no sense in discussing the terms of tlie right
to autonony of the Sudeten Germans •.. The request
for German military sovereignty" (as suggested by the
Sudeten German Party in a plan submitted to Hitler)
"vrould naturally include the request that Czechoslovakia
vjithdraw from ary treaties directed against Germary«
Even if such a far-reaching program is not desired, or
cannot be realized at the present moment, the request
for the annulment of such treaties should be made an
independent requests
"Under no circumstances must the solution of the
Sudeten German question be delayed by negotiations
and discussions on the aforementioned problems# For
these reasons v/e ydll have to see to it that in future
discussions with the British the Sudeten-German
problems on the one hand and the other problems on
the other hand be treated differently with regard to
the time# The Hungarians and Poles must be vron for
this idea."
The defendant Ritter, in the German Foreign Office, was
Ambassador for Special Assignments. His principal function was to
coordinate the aggressive policy between the Foreign Office and
the High Command of the ^"'ehrmacht. It is not siurprising that his
conduct ties in closely to criminal conduct found by the EIT in
its discussions of the defendant Rlbbentrop on the one hand, and
the conduct of Keitel and Jodl of the High Command, on the other
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hand. By "v^ay of Gxaiiplo wo shall quote ono oxccrpt from the
II^T judgment concerning Koitcl and one from the HfT judgment
concerning Ribbontrop® "."e shall then quote from a mcnorandum
of the defendant Ritter which shoivs his coordinating role in the
diplomatic and the r.iilitary maneuvers involved in aggression.
In the case of Kcitel, the D,iT held:
^ "Formal planning for attacking Greece and Xugoslavia
had begun in Moverbor 19I4O, On lO March 19Ul Keitcl
hoard Hitler toll Racdcr complete occupation of
Greece was a prerequisite to scttlcnentp and also
hoard Hitler decree on 27 March that the destruction
' of Yugoslavia should take place with 'unmerciful
harshness'." (P.289, Vol.1.)
In the case of Ribbcntrop^ the E'lT judgment states:
"Von Ribbcntrop attended the conference on 20 January
I9IIL, at vJiich Hitler and ?'Ussolini discussed the
proposed attack on Greece, and the conference in
* January 19l;l, at rJiich Hitler obtained from Antonescu
permission for German troops to go through Roumania
for this attack." (p.286, Vol.X.)
In January of 19Ul Keitcl informed Ritter of the aggressive war
stops to bo taken in the Balkans. Kcitel told Ritter that the date
for the attack against Greece was set for the beginning of Api^il and
that the German troops should enter Bulgaria at the latest possible
moment. Based on this conversation, iir^bassador Ritter proposed
the policy which Ribbcntrop and the Foreign Office should now
follow in order to coordinate military and diplomatic acts in the
schoduled aggressions. Hitter's ovn proposal for the policy
s^mchronization reads:
"During the next two or three weeks a number of actions
in the field of foreign policy have to be timed and^
coordinated with the military situation and the rllitary
activities ..." (Pros, "xli.300, NG-3097)-
In the same memorandum Ritter mapped out actions, \7hich included tlie
renovation of the Bulgari'in-Turkish non-aggression pact, the entry
of Bulgaria into the Tri-Partite Pact, and an open statement of
Gcrioan policy concerning Turkey.
••'hen we come to the defendant Veosonmayer, his conduct has
strilcing comparisons to some of the conduct which the BIT ci.iphasizod
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iin finding Seyss-Inquart guilty of crimes against peace* Both
v/ere masters of Nazi intrigue in the territory of Germany's
neighbors. TTith respect to the intrigue in Austria, Seyss-
Inquart vras the Austrian traitor and as such he has held the
limelight concerning the v/hole affair. Hovrever, the
contemporaneous documents in this case show that actually Seyss-
Inquart was directly subordinate to the defendants Keppler and
Veesenmayer.in the whole Austrian action. As Hitler's personal
representative in Austria in 1937 and early 1938^ the defendants
Keppler and Veesenmayer used Seyss-Inquart as the principal
tool for turning and preparing the forcible i\nschluss. Concerning
Seyss-Inquart's role, the II":T stated;
"Seyss-Inquart participated in the last stages of the
Nazi intrigue which preceded the German occupation of
Austria ..."
In connection with the intrigue which led to the separation of
Slovakia from the sovereign Czechoslvak State, both the defendants
Veesenmayer and Keppler were topmost representatives of the
German Foreign Office in engineering this important aspect of the
entire aggression against Czechoslovakia. Both Veesenmayer and
Keppler played a substantial role by personal conversation in
inducing Tiso to go to Berlin. Koppler accompanied Tiso to Berlin
when Hitler, in the presence of the defendant Keppler, forced the
hand of Tiso. 'Then this aggression was completed, it v^as
Veesenmayer alone v;ho went to Danzig in order to foment a proper
basis for engineering the next German aggression against Poland,
It was also Veesenmayer who provided a principal Justification
for the aggression against lugoslavia by precipitating the secession
of Croatia at the eleventh hour. Veesenmayer moved from one spot
to another as the maneuvers of aggression required. Our brief "iTill
demonstrate in full the significant role that Veesenmayer played in
making and breaking governments and in providing "'.quisites for a
number of Gormn aggressions,
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Te now come to the defendant Otto Meissner. • Meissner
participated in a number of outstanding international meetings
which were part and parcel of Germany *s political aggression# - •
Meissner was present at the meeting with the Slovak president
Tiso which prepared the separation of Slovakia from the sovereign
Czechoslovak State. He was present at the conferences with
President Hacha when Hacha was bullied into surrendering
Czechoslovakia without resistance upon threat of devastation.
Meissner was present at the conferences with Japanese Foreign
Minister llatsuoka in which Japan was urged;
"... to strike at the right moment and take the risk
upon herself of a fight against America."
But upon a reconsideration of all of the evidence in the case, we
are not convinced that the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant lieissner took substantial initiative or played an
important ro3e in bringing about these conferences, in influencing
what was said or done, or in following up on any decisions taken.
After Hitler became both Fuehrer and Refch Chancellor of Germany,
it appears that in the consolidation of executive functions under
Hitler, Ihe functions of the Chief of the presidential Cliancollery
were narrowed. In the field of foreign policy, the Offic*^ of the
Presidential Chancellery did perform certain functions of protocol
and no doubt it was not entirely sterile in influencing or
executing the foreign policy of the Third Reich. But on the basis
of the entire record ^we are not convinced that we have established
our burden of shoi'/ing a substantial participation by Meissner in
the preparation, initiation or waging of aggressive war. It does
I
appear that the Office of the presidential Chancellery played a
highly significant part in certain policy matters, especially in
respect to the treaianent of certain prisoners turned over for
"special treatment" or murder to the Gestapo. Such conduct,
however, is propei-ly a matter for consideration under Count V.
ITherefore,'upon considors'tion of all the evidence in the case^
the prosecution feels that it has not established its burden of
proof as against the defendant Heissner with respect to crimes
against peace •• Bie prosecution herety formally withdraws its
charges against the defendant Otto Heissner under Counts I and II
of the indictment.
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2. KROSIGK
There is cn adequate basis for convicting von ICaOSIG-K
on Countby analogizing his case to the cases of Funk
and Schacht, defendants in the IMT case. In fact, his
guilt is more clearly established than that of Failk, in some
respects, because of the long period of time during
which he gave his services to the Nazi regime. He
encompasses much of the early period during which the
IMT found Schacht played a dominant role, as well as
t^he later periqd when Schacht retired and Funk was
Plenipotentiary General for War Soonomy.
To elaborate this a little more; As to Schacht,
the IMT summed up the issue in the following sentence
(Vol. I, IMT, p. 310):
®fse against Schacht therefore
depends on the inference that
M 4*^ i'act know of theiVazi aggressive plans,"
That inference, the imt said,
"has not been established beyond a
reasonable doubt." (Ibid, p. 310)
The basis for that remaining reasonable doubt is
xplained in the earlier discussion of the case against
Schacht, It was not that Schacht could not have
known of the aggressive objective of the rearmament
program, quite the contrary, the imt specifically
recognized that anyone with a knowledge of German
finances was in a particularly good position to realize
that the armament policy had aggression as its object.
The IMT said:.
"hf othep hand, Schacht, withp intimate knowledge of German
ri.ianoe, was in a peculiarly good
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tposition to understand the true
significance of Hitler^s frantic
rearmament, and to realize that the
economic policy adopted was consis
tent only with war as its object."
(Ibid, p. 309),
The basis, then, was the lack of participation
in the economic program after its aggressive purpose
became evident. The BJT apparently accepted Schacht's
own explanation of his conduht. Of it, the IHT said:
"Sohacht, as early as 1936, began to
advocate a limitation of the rearma-
financial reasons,had the policies advocated by him
not\ovp Germany would
" prepared for a generalInsistence on his
frnm =1? eventual dismissal
^ canno 1 S°®l'''l°ns Of economic significe in Germany." (Ibid, p. 309).
In the light of this reasoning, there can be no
question but that Schacht would have been guilty
under Count ix of the IMT case (Count 1, this case)
had he continued to cooperate in the economic program,
rather than adopting a policy of opposition which
eventually brought about his dismissal. If there
were any doubt about it, the Judgment as to Funk
dispels ita The first sentence of the judgment
finding Punk guilty statesi
"Funk became active in the economic
field after the Nazi plans to wage
aggressive war had been clearlv
defined." (Ibid, p. 304).
Then, afte.r outlining his activity, the IMT concluded;
"Funk was not one of the leading
figures In originating the Nazi
plans for aggressive war. His
activity In the economic sphere
was under the supervision of
Goerlng as Plenipotentiary General
of the 4-,.year plan. He did, how
ever , participate In the economic
preparation for certain of the
aggressive wars, notably those
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against Poland and the Soviet Union,
but his guilt Can be adequately
dealt with undej? Count Two of the
Indictment." (Ibid, p. 305).
Schacht escaped conviction because the IKT was
at least partially convinced by his story that he
began to put on financial brakes as soon as he was
convinced of the aggressive designs of Hitler. How
ever, when Schacht was trying to slow down rearmament,
f-, iUlOSIGK increasingly was sponsoring the measures
which made Schacht's objective impossible, Schacht
^ was not only in opposition to Geering in the economic
field, but was also in opposition to von KROSIGK in
^ the financial field, KROSIGK knew that if the M3F0
bills were to be paid — 12 billion of them — that
I'Carmament would slow down, because the money was
not there for both repayment and continued rearmament.
He chose, despite that fact, to allocate the money
further armament, rather than meet the IvIEFO obliga
tion. At the very best, he cast his lot with the
aggressors^ rather than with Schacht. The facts are
discussed at length in the KROSIGK brief of the Prose
cution.
Relative to later r«earmament the JMT said, in
its decision on Funk;
"Punk became active in the economic
field after the Nazi plans to wag®
aggressive war had been clearly
defined." (Ibid, p. 304).
As to von KROSIGK, we need modify that sentence in
only one respect, so that it would read; Von KROSIGK
.^outirm^ ^ ^ active in the economic field after
the Nazi plans to wage aggressive war had been clearly
defined. The IMT begins its recitals on Funk «
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Iwith the CSoerlng speech of 14 October 1938, at whibh
a "igigantlc increase in armaments" was announced. For
von KROSIGKi we can go further back to pick up the
threads, and show how, by the end of 1938, the Ministry
of ^inance was completely allied with and an Integral
part of the whole, rearmament program.
It will be remembered that it was in 1936 that
Sohaoht, according to the B£T began to advocate a
limitation on armaments, and, as the IMT said, because
of his intimate knowledge of German finance, was in a
good position to realize that Hitler's "frantic
rearmament" was "consistent only with war as its
object" (Ibid, p, 309), The documents certainly fully
bear out the intimate knowledge which von KROSIGK had
of all matters of finance and economics in the prepara
tion for war. They also show that von KROSIGK's •
attitude conformed thoroughly to the will of Hitler
to rearm as quickly as possible, and that von KROSIGK
participated in the top-level discussions at which
the policy of more and more armament was revealed
and insisted upon despite Schacht's objection.
It is worthwhile noting again the dissimilarity
between von KROSIGK and Sohacht, This was the time
when Schacht began definitely to lose out. The IMT
said:
"Goering advocated a greatly e3?panded
program for the production of synthe
tic raw materials which was opposed
by Schacht on the ground that the
resulting financial strain might in
volve inflation," (Ibid, pp,307-308).
As we have seen, Von KROSIGK, who was also on the
council which had to do with raw materials and foreign
exchange, went along with the program.
IShe lUT said;
"The influence of Schacht suffered
further when in October 16, 1936,
(ioering was appointed Plenipotentiary
for the 4^ year plan with the tash of
putting 'the entire economy in a
state of readiness for war' within
four years♦ Schaoht had opposed the
announcement of this plan and the
appointment of Goerlng to head it,
and it is clear that Hitler's action
represented a decision that Schacht's
economic policies were too conservative
for the drastic rearmament policy which
Hitler wanted to put Into effect."
(Ibid, p. 307),
There is no evidence that von KHOSICJK opposed the plan,
or Goering's appointment. He went along, fully. Schacht
went on leave of absence from the Ministry of Scohomics
in September, 1937, and resigned as Minister of Economics
and as Plenipotentiary for War Economy in November, 1937
(IMT, p. 307), Von KROSIGK stayed on, cooperating at
the highest policy level. Certainly when one was in a
position so high . a cabinet minister —> that he parti
cipated in all of these activities, the denial of
knowledge and realization is patently absurd.
Liike Funk, von KROSIGK knew what he was doing
when he continued action in late 1938, That von KRDSXGK
knew of the plan to smash Czechoslovakia, and lent hie
willing aid to finance the necessary preparations is
not contested. On 1 September 1938 von KRDSIOK wrote
to Hitler (Exh. 1165, ECU419, Bk, 70-B, p. 67). In it
he explains the financial situation; the measures he
has taken to meet the rearmament program, and the steps
he has taken to meet the "basic change" in 1938 caused
by the retaking of Austria, the Western fortifications
and the "increased tempo of armament." He ends the
letter with a statement that:
II
^ , the day will not be far off
when the final death thrust can be '
dealt to the Czechs." (Sxh. 1165,p.70
suiora) ♦
Von ^OSIGK may argue that the letter counsels caution,
as it does,, and that it makes von ICROSIGK like Schacht.
The difference is that von KROSIGK*s worries are not,
as Schacht^a were found to be, about whether there
would be an aggressive war, but one solely as to when
the aggression should occur. He thought, and argued,
that Germany's head start on the Western Democracies
Was not yet great enough. He said (p. 70, supra) J
"Most important is; 'time works in our favor'. .
We therefore can only gain by waiting." But beyond
a doubt, as early as 1 September 1938 — before Goering's
speech of 14 October 1938 — von KROSIGK was aware that
the first object of. all the frantic rearmament was "tte
final death thrust" to the Czechs.
We can put von KROSIGK side by side with Funk.
The IMT said, in discussing Funk's Crimes against
peace:
"On October 14, 1939, after the war
had begun, he made a speech in which
he elated that the economic and,
financial departments of Germany
working under the 4-year plan had
been engaged in the secret economic
preparation for over a year." (Vol.1,
mT, p. 305).
This would put the beginning of Funk's and von KROsiGK's
most secret war preparation back to about mid-1938,
when the new armament plan was announced, the Reich's
Defense Council was reorganized, and when the new
financing plan was drawn up. In every aspect, von
KROSIGK was in up to his neok^i
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When we oome to the year- 1939, vre find von
KllCSIuh, .and the hinietx'y of j?."'..y-:-.'; -vc.t
more important part in the war preparations; the
Reichsbanh which until then had been an important,.
and an independent instrumentality of wa"^ financing,
became in 1939 completely subservient to the Finance
Minister. Von KROSIGK, subject only to Hitler, became
the predominant financial power in the Reich.
One of the two meetings cited in the IMT Judgment
against Funh is the meeting of May 30> 1939, (p. 304),
The IliT said:
"On iday 30, 1939; the Under Secretary
of the Liinistry of Uconomics attended
a meeting at which detailed plans were
made for the financing of the war."
Similarly^ the Under Secretary of the Idihistry
of Finance,, Reinhsjrdtj also attended . the meeting; •
(3562-:?S, iixh* lOllj Bh;- 70-C, pi 73). ^The;mtnutes
state (p. 73);. "To be shown to the. Mlnlstef' f or hie
information". The .text of the minutes makes it obvipus
why the IMT cited it as imiportanti A partial transla
tion of page 1 of the: minutes states Cp. 74) f
"Then a report was made of: the con*-
tents of the 'Notes on the f^uestion of
internal '^inanclng of the VTar', of
9 May of this year,' in which the
figures given to me by the Reichs
Minister of Finance, are also discussed. "
Von KROSIGK had been active already in making financial
plane for the prosecution of the war, What kind of a
War? The minutes give a definite answer (p. 75):
"First, as concerns the scope of the
total production, it Is clear that the
economic power of- the- protectorate and
and of other territories, possibly to
•• •• be .acGul'-'ed, must of course be com
pletely exhausted for the purpose of
the conduct of the war. • It is, however,
just as clear that these territories
, Cannot obtain any compensation from the
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1economy of Greater Germany foT' the "oro-
aucts which they will have to give us
during the war, "because this power
must be used fully for the war and for'
supplying the civilian home population.
It is therefore superfluous to add any
amount for such compensation to the
deot of the domestic German war financing.
The question as to what labor forces,
new products and other commodities in
the Protectorate and in the territories
to "be acquired can be utilized for us
• . . thus can "be excluded from this
investigation. Insofar as it should
happen that, for political reasons,
deliveries without any expectancy of
compensation cannot be demanded of the
occupied' terr'itories, to that extent
we will be able to pay with debt certi
ficates of the Reich, , ,"
array can reckon, out01 the economy of the Greater German-,
substantially only with deliveries to
nh? portion of productionpeacetime is attriouted to the
s^enditures—minus the ralnimun
requirements of the civilian governmental
apncies. In order to cover additional
requirements of the Army the economic
. ^'fotectorate and of theterritories to be acqui-^ed durinp* the
cajnpaign, must be used."
"The war" is now the topic. And we will search
in vain for even a suggestion that it is a "defensive"
war. Von KROSIGK is plainly participating, on the
highest level, in the plan to acquire territory for
Germany by force of arras. Czechoslovakia had been
taken overj Poland was next. Hitler's decision had
already been made, and announced at a meeting of 23 Hay
1939. (lUT, pp. 198-204). That von KROSIGK was a key
figure in the planning is shown oy the evidence and
diecuased in the briefs.
KROSIGK" did a stupendous job. Without in the
slightest degree minimizing the importance of the week
of many other parts of the Hitler government, one can
still assert that fugds are the sinews of war prerDara^
tion and war waging. Money had to "be available, and it
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was up to von KHOSIGIC^ as the liilnlstej? of finance,
to supply that money, by taxes, long-term loans,
short-term loans, proceeds of confiscation, and the
like,- The fact that the Finance Minister did not
personally participate In all of the high-level
strategy conferences where military timetables were
worhed out principally with military strategists is
not surprising, and it does not detract from his
responsibility any more than his presence at them
would add to his responsibility. For KHOsiQK's posi
tion was not the determination of a particular mill-•
tary timetable, his job was to prepare the stage for
for those who would ultimately determine the' exact
time and the exact place of a particular offensive.
Von KHOSIGk was sufficiently acquainted with the
secret plans concerning particular and specific
^bgressions, as the documents show, so that he could
provide the necessary financial assistance and so
that he could suggest any moaifications demanded by
the exigencies of the financial situation or the
flnancla.1 possibilities.
'^hen funds were needed, they were there. '^ 'e
have no evidence to indicate that Hitler's preparations
for aggressive war suffered in the slightest from the
need of Rslchmarhs, In von HROSIGK's particular field,
the internal financing of the war, the striking thing
about the documents is that they reveal no particular
worry of the war mongers at where the money would come
from. Von iCHOSIGK could be depended upon to supply it.
How, then, can the Minister of '^inanoe, who takes
^e of employing "^all cash and reserves" for the
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Iarmament program and who curtails all other expenses
in the interest of that program^ deny that he played
the leading role in financing the arm^ent?
The evidence emphasizes the ability and the
dedication with which von KHOSIGK performed the task
allotted to him in the preparation for war. It is
further indicated that activities of von KBOSIG-K
extended beyond the taxgatherer field. His financial
tasks even carried him into dealings with the SS con
cerning the proceeds and the- loot of their horrible
activities. His participation in wa,r planning and
war waging covers the entire Nazi epoch. After the
war broke out, von KHOSIG-K shoved the same energy m
garnering the required funds v/hich he displayed in
making available the funds which made the la.unohing
of war possible. KROSIGK mobilized all the forces
for the financial victory, paying attention to the
whole of Nazi economy as it enfolded with the occupa
tion of most of Rujrope, ICHOSIGIC never wavered in his
enthusiasm and laoors for the Nazi cause. That he
has admitted this before this Tribunal and has not
a ttempted to fabricate for himself a position in the
resistance movement Is noteworthy. But the attempt
to dra.w parallels between his course and that of
Schacht is utterly impossible. The analogy to Funk,
however, is a reality, except that Funk put a heavy
shoulder to the wheel much later in the cdjr than did
von KHOSIGK.
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3. LAMMSHS and STUCKART
In analyzing the jvidence, it will not 'be necot-'sary
to travel over unchartered seas. The verisimiltude
between the evidence adduced aga.lnst Frick in the HIT,
which resulted in a finding of guilt and a sentence
to death by hanging, with the evidence presented against
IiAlfc^FRS and STUCKART is unusual. It denlcts an almost
identical pattern of crime, a,lthough, as we stp.ted
earlier, the evidence in this case is more abundant
on these defendants than it was on Frick in the lilT
Case,
The defendants suomit, however, that their posi
tions were utterly Insignificant; that their signatures
under la,ws and decrees were purely formal, fhd the
legislative enactments in which they participated
were ineffectual from the very outset; that the reports
which were being submitted to them were cith'er obsolete
when they reached them or not wrarthy of their interest;
that the agencies of which they were mem'bers were
stillborn children and their enactments abortive; and
that their knowledge of happenings in the Third Raich
was as scanty as that of an average woebegone German
citizen. In a word, they were walking blindfolded
through the horrors of the Third Reich, Authentic
captured documents from German official sources were -
as these defendants would have the Court believe - the
archetypes of inexactitude and error.
The phraseology of the documents in evidence is
so plain and self-explanatory that they hardly call for
any further interpretation. They speak for themsolvos.
In short, these defendants and their witnesses succeeded
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iin clutterin^^ up the record with a mass of testimony
which/ insofa.^ as one can tellj had no other purpose
than to bewilder, confuse and evade the issues.
We,' of course, disagree emphatically with LAI'^ STRS'
and STUCKART's technloue of taking such a self-deprecating
view of their positions, functions, guilt sjid responsi
bility. Ihe evidence portrays them in their true
perspective. It overwhelmingly shows that LAI.II/ISRS and
STUCKART were architects who designed catastrophe.
In theory it may be true that in a Fuehrer state
the supreme legislative and administrative powers aore
^ vested in the Fuehrer, in practice, however, his
powers had meaning and effect through the agencies
which were charged with tr.ansposlng the political will
of the Third Reich into the phraseology of laws and
decrees anc. to see to it that they were also being
I enforced. In almost every phase of this procedure
, LAIvk'SRS and STUCKART were instrumental factors. Ref
erence is made to the great number of cT'imlnal laws
t
and decrees with which we have dealt a.t length,
in the individual briefs of the defendants.
M' ••
These defendants were not only leaders in the
Third Reich.but had reputations as being outstanding
authorities in law, particularly in the fields of
constitutional and administrative law. It is a generally
recognized maxim that no man may plead ignorance of the
law as an excusei But when trained lawyers deliberately
prepared and issued laws and decrees "hich they knew at
the time violated every st;andard of Justice common
decency a,nd the defined principles of civilized criminal
law as well as of International law, then the seriousness
50-
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of their crimes is magnifiedi '•L'here is a peculiar
element of premeditation and deliberation in all the
acts for which LAI '^ililERS and STUCKAHl ore being held
responsible-. It is impossible for a lawyer to sit
down and draft and participate in the preparing of a
more or less complicated legal document without consld—
/
erlng the question of its legality. And, if the trained
lawyer continued' to turn out criminal legislation fcr
years and yerars, so to say as a matter of routine, this
becomes an especially aggravating factor. Such abts
have been so adjudged in the "Justice" case before
Tribunal Wo., 3.
In brief, LAr>lI.'il]RS and &TUOKART were in possession
of the heaviest imaginable res,ionslbllit2''i As la^ye.rs,
they were fully aware of this and thoroughly cognizant
of the possible repercussions yrhich their acts i'"0uld
Cause,
The position of heitel whom the lUT found "did
not have command authority over the three Wehrmacht
branches which enjoyed direct a.Gcess to the Supreme
Commander", (Vol. I; p. 288) is mutatis mutandis
comparable to that of LAI'iOvlSRS, Defense Counsel of
LAMi.lRRS pointed out in his opening statement the
similarity of positions held by Keitel and LAIIIIRHS- ,
had to admit on cross-examination - with the
usual reservations - th.at "for certain military matters
his (Keitel's) position is comparable to mine insofar
as military and civilian matters are comparable at
all." (tr.p, 22304). In spite of the judgment of the
TiiT! that Keitel as head of Hitler's military staff
had no power to give orders, he was convicted on all
4 counts of the indictment before the IMT, including
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"the plc.rming, prepe-ration, initiatinj^ or
the "conspiracy"- and/^^aging wars" count.
In the Ministry of Interior, STUCKAET, like Priok,
was a dominating influence in the waging of war, Kis
importance constantly increased. The XMT found Frick
guilty of Count II of the Indictment. (HilT; p. 301).
As pointed out "before, Count 11 of the IMT is ano,logous
to Count I of this case (aggressive wa.r count), Frick
was found guilty of waging aggressive war des'oite the
fact that "the evidence does not show that he partici
pated in any of the conferences at which Hitler outlined
his aggressive intentions." (II£Tj p. 299). Thusly,
Frick was acquitted under Count I in the J^IT (Conspiracy
Count), but found guilty under Count II (aggressive
war count).
Wa submit that the S'lUCKART case is parallel in
every particular to the Frick Case, The LAI!v1i;-iiJPlS case
is also parallel to the Frick case and may further he
compared to the Keitel case. The evidence which the
prosecution has submitted in support of these charges
is very extensive. For reasons of expediency we direct
the Tribunal's attention to the individual responsibility
hriefs of the prosecution. The evidence which will re
viewed discloses that LAMIjIFRS and STUGKART hecajne
Involved in the Crimes against Peace, War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity to a greater extent than Frick
and is sufficient to weave a second mantle of guilt.
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4. DIi:TRlCH
The tremendous Importance of the role played "by
DI^HICH's press propaganda in carrying through the
plans and objectives of the aggressive war machine —
in promoting the conoentratlon and stimulation of the
energies of the German people as a result of- such
press propaganda,, ca.nnot easily he exaggeravted.
The development of the press as a ^weapon was
the most important single aspect of propaganda as a
whole. The printed word has a magic of its own.
•Hitler saw this at an early point in his career and
it was no accident that he selected BISTRICH to super
vise and control the press policy in furtherance of
his aims. •
Mr, Qyilncy Wright, in "The Qrime of War Hongering"
(42 American Journal of International Law 128 - January
1948) says:
. propaganda which instigates or
encourrages aggression or other crimes
against international law had 'been
considered a crime, not in itself,
but because of its relationship to
the international delinouency or crime
which it incites . . . Where instiga
tion of international delinquency or
crime is concerned the Question
relates to the importance of the
propaganda in producing the crime
or delinquency," (p. 131),
"Insofar as such propaganda provolces
or encourages aggression or other
interHrational crime; it becomes a
crime itself," (p, 132).
f
falRTHICH was successful in suppressing the.
editorial work of the German press to such an extent
that the IMT said of it: (IMT, p. 182)
,r53~*
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"Through the effective control of the
ra^io and the press, the German people,
during the years which followed 1933i
were subjected to the most Intensive
propo-gsiida in furtherance of the
regime. Hostile criticism of any
kind was forhidden, and the severest
penalties were Imposed on those wrho
indulged in it, independent judg^
ment, "based on freedom of thought
was rendered quite impossible."
wm
N,V.
In such an atmosphere the criminal responsibility
of DIITHICH is immeasurably heightened. His control
of the press became a lethal weapon in the condition
ing of the people to accept aggressive wars, This
weapon was as necessary for the realization of the
Nazi program as the large-scale production of armaments
and the drafting of military plans. Without DIETRICH'S
press, it would not have been leossible for German
Foscism to realize its aggressive intentions, to lay
the groundwork for and then to perpetrate war crimes
and crimes against humanity. The particulars in sup
port of this position are extensively set forth for
the Tribunal's consideration in the prosecution's
final "brief against DIETRICH,
The mT clearly followed the theory expressed
by Ilr- ^ulncy Wright In the case of the defendant
Strelcher;
"In his speeches and articles, week
after week, month after month, he
infected the German mind with the
virus of anti-Semitism, and incited
the German ]people to active pereecu,
tlon." (lUT, p. 302)
DIETRICH'S case is more far-reaching than that of
Streioher in that his guilt Includes Grimes against
Peace, as well as War C-rlmes aiid Crimes against
Humanity, Streioher was the editor of a comparatively
email weekly periodical,. "The Stuermer", published
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In Nurnberg, At the height of its ill fame, it
"boosted a circulation of 600,000, Whereas DIETRICH
had at his disposal, not only Stretcher's paper, but
more than 3,000 other publications with a circulation
of better than 30,000,000* '-^"he evidence shows the
character sjid intensity of the anti-Semitic directives
released by the defendant DIETRICH during the period
to which the EiT referred in passing judgment on
Streioher. Streicher's publication, then, was only
one of the manifold vehicles, v-:hich were ultim-?.tely ;
subject to DIETRICH In furthering the provocation
of international crimes.
Of course, Streicher was acquitted "by the IlilT
for Crimes against Peace, Concerning him the B-T
stated: "There is no evidence to show that he was
ever within Hitler's inner cricle of advisers; nor
during his career v^as he closely connected with the
formulation of the policies which led to war" (p. 302,
Vol, I, BIT-). DIETRICH'S relation to the inner circle
of advisers was quite different. Wot only was he
Reich Press Chief of Party and State, an intimate of
Hitler from 1928 on; not only was the defendant a member
of that select hierachy of Relchsleiter which included
such figures as Hess, Hlmmler, hey, Darre, G-oebbels,
Frank, and Rosenberg, with all the accessibility to
top secret Information which such membership necessarily
entails. DIETRICH was entrusted,in the field of press
propaganda, with the dally responsibility for the
acquisition, digest, selection, and transmission of
information, of all types, on all levels, from every
source, and for every purpose. He issued press
instructions labeled "Daily Paroles of the Reich Press
Chief", which directed the press to present to the
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people certain themes, such as the leadership princixDle,
the Jewish problem, the problem of living space, or
other standard Nazi ideas "which served as a condition
precedent in tempering the masses of German people to
each aggression.
The evidence before this Tribunal clearly
estcablishes Dli^THICH's guilt for Crimes a-gainst Peace,
as well as War Crimes and Crimog against Humanity,
The facts are discussed in the DI3TPIICH brief. The -
application of the principle of law set forth in the
Streichor case by the IMT makes the conclusion
inescapable.
5. BERGSR and SCHHLL3NBERG
The defendants BHRGSR and SCH3LL5MB3RG found
full scope for their talents in areas where activities
of the SS and of the Government proper were most
closely fused and where the politics and the programs
of the Third Reich, murderous in nature from, the
beginning, reached their natural fulfillment.
The record is. replete with evidence of their
fanatical contributions to the genoclda.1 policy of
the Third Reich, Llore reference to the briefs suffices.
Hov/ever, the part played by the SS in Crimes ??^alnst
Peace is directed to the Tribunal's attention. Of the
SS, the IMT said:
"SS units were active participants
in the steps leading up to aggressive
war," (IMT, p. 270).
BSRGHR and SCHELLSNBSRG were not minor figures in the
SS, BRRGER was chief of the SS Main Office and
SCHSLLRNBSRG was subordinated only to Heydrich and
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later to Kaltenbrunner in the SD (a component part
of the SS), The IHT specifically stated of SS
activities!
"The Verfuegungstruppe was used in
the occupation of the Sydetenlandj
of Bohemia and Moravia, and of Memel.
The Henlein Free Corps was under the
Jurisdiction of the Reichsfuehrer SS
for operations in the Sudetenl/^jid in
1938, and the Volhsdeutschemittelstelle
financed fifth-column activities there,"
(IMT, p.. 270).
The defendant BFRGFR Issued the orders subordinating
the Free Corps to the SS for the purpose of effecting
the aggression i">^ith full knowledge of the purx^ose
of the Free Corps. BFRGSR mas the sole link between
V
the SS and the Free Corps. The proof shows that
he supplied the Free Corps mith the arms necessary
to fulfill its mission,
BiHGFR^s activities did not stop there however,
1/^ He was engaged in organizing so-called defense units
if of forces indigenous to the occupied eastern terri
tories, three weeks after the Invasion of Poland,
He established contact ^'-ith the Dutch Nazi leaders
in Duoeseldorf which led to the setting up in 1940
of the Dutch special duty regiment "West Land".
Immedio-tely after the invasion of Belgium, BERGSR
became president of DeValag, a pro-Nazi political
party in Belgium under German sponsorship. He em
ployed this party primarily to further <aggX'essive
warfare, And, he succeeded in bringing the German
racial group in Yugoslavia, under the SS six months
before the invasion of that country.
It is next to Impossible to single out any one
portion of the SS which was not Involved in these
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criminal activities charged in the indiotmentj but
it is safe to say that the evil of the RSHA (Gestapo
and 3D) is exceeded by none» Of it the II^T saldl
"The nature of their participation is
shown by measures tahen in the summer
of 1938 in preparation for the attach
•ft on CzechoslovoXia which was then in
p contemplo-ticno -i^insatzgruppen of the
X Gestapo and SD were organized to fol-
1 low the army into Czechoslovahia, to
provide for the security and political
life of the occupied territories. Plans
were made for the infiltration of SD
men into the area in advance, and for
the building up of a system of files
to indicate wha.t inhabitants should be
t placed under surveillance, deprived
of passports, or liquidated. These
plrans were considerably altered due
to the cancellation of the attack on
Czechoslovakia, but in the military
^ operations which actually occurred,
particularly in the war against U. S. S.R.,
Sins.atzgruppen of the Security Police
and SD went into operation, and com
bined brutal measures for the pacifica
tion of the civilian population with
the wholesale slaughter of Jews.
Heydrich gave orders to fabricate inci-} dents on the Polish-German frontier^in
1939 which would give Hitler sufficient
provocation to attack Poland, Hoth
Gestapo and SD personnel were Involved
in these operations." (IMT, p. 266).
f The proof shows that SCHSLLSNBSRG was the master mind
of such projects. Pa,rticu5.arly in the creation of
f the Binsatzgruppon to be used after the invasion of
' the U. S, S. R. In May 1941 he drafted the final agree
ment which established the Einsatzgruppen for use in
the Bast with full knowledge that Russia was to be
'j
invaded. An integral part of this operation was the
screening and jnterrogating of prisoners to determine
their usefulness for the illegal purposes of the
Third Reich, SCHSLLHNBBRG headed an operation
entitled "Zeppelin" which employed those selected
for work on the eastern front behind Russian lines
and to work with the Slnsatsgruppen, The evidence in
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the SCHELLjENBHIRG case reveals that the staging of
an incident for a pretext to invade Poland was only
a fore-runner to further trickery "by the Gestapo
and SS under the direct command of SCHSLhBNBBHG in
creating a pretext to invade Holland, The Vcnld
incident was clearly on underhanded SS method to
provide Hitler with sufficient provocation to march
into Hollp.nd,
The record is complete. BHRGSR and
participated in the c rimina.1 plans of the SS in
steps leading up to aggressive wars as outlined "by
the IMT.
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6. KOERI'IER, ICEPPLER, PLEIGSR, and Di\RP^.
The Tribunal's attention is draTm to the parallel activities
of these defendants to the defendants Goerin^, Hess and Funk who
vrere convicted by the IiIT for Crimes a.^ainst Peace* ICEPPtHlR,
PLEIGER, i\IiD DjYRPlE are charged with Grimes against Peace
principally because of the significant role they played in organizing
and maintaining the military economy of Germany with knovfledge of
the purpose to wage aggressive vrar, KEPPIFR is further charged
with activities in the diplomatic field as a State Secretary in
the Foreign Office,
FOERIJER
The case of KQERi™, stripped of all details, amounts to ttiis;
He v^as to Goering what Hess vfas to Hitler, yith respect to Hess,
the Ii:t found:
"Until iiis flight to England, he was Hitler's closest
personal confident. Their relationship was such tliat
Hess must have been informed of Hitler's aggressive
plans vfhen they came into existence," (p,28i|)
The Tribunal said;
"Between 1933 and 1937^ Hess made speeches in wliich
he ejcpressed a desire for peace and advocated
international economic cooperation. But nothing
which that contained, can alter the fact that of all
the defendants, none kne?/ better than Hess, hov;
etermined Hitler y/as to realize his ambitions, hovr
lanatical and violent he was, and hovr little lilcely
le was to refrain from resort to force if this was
the only way in which he could achieve his aims."
The Tribunal found Hess guilty of Crimes against Peace under Counts
One and Two.
It is interesting to note that HOERMER's defense is along the
line that Goering was a man of peace, that his violent speeches,
plainly aggressive in character, vrere not to be taken seriously,
and at least that KOERMER, because of his close relationshin with
Goering, knew and appreciated the peaceful character of the man.
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The UtT, with respect to Goering, stated-
"After his cfira admissions to this Tribunal^ from
positions which he held^ the conferences which he
attended, and the public v/ords he uttered, there
can remain no doubt that Goering "vvas the moving
force for aggressive war, second only to Hitler
(p«280).
And in concluding its appraisal of Goering's activities, the
Tribunal stated;
"His guilt is unique in its enormity^ The record
dxscloses no excuses for tJiis man»" (p.282)
KOERNER, the record shows, v/as Goeringis closest personal and
officxal associate. He first met him in 1926, and in 1928 when
Goerxng was elected to the Reichstag, KOER^hSR severed his private
business connections so that he could be closer to Goering, He
stayed vdth Goering tlirough the entire period of the Nazi seizure
and consolidation of power. He participated with Goering in
setting up the Gestapo as an instrument of force and terror. He
was the administrative head of the special "spying agency" -
the Forschungsamt - an organization vriiicli monitored conversations
of Germans.
Goering v/as appointed Plenipotentiary General of the Four Year
Plan xn 1936, and designated KOERI^IER as his permanent deputy.
KQGRNER v^as also Goering's permanent deputy in the General Council
of the? Four Year plan. The evidence fully establishes KOERf!ER's
special knowledge of the military character of the Four Year Plan,
that it ^iras intended as, and developed into an instrument to mako
military machihe to further Germany's policy of aggression,
AOERNER, IGilPPlER and VON I®OSIGK vrore present at the secret
conference vdien Goering informed them of the nature of Hitler's
secret memorandum of August 1936 r/hich discussed the true purposes
of the Four Year plan. In addition to being advised by Goering
of Hitler's secret memorandum, KQERNTm admitted that Goering gave
him this memorandum to read and that he read it. KOFRJriJR tovstified
he never spoke to anyone about this secret memorandum of Hitler,
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except to Goering and t!ie other persons present at the meetins»
There were only three copies of this memorandnn - one went to
Goerlri'^y another was later ^iven by Hitler to Spoor and the third
is not accounted for. The details of KOERKiER's participation in
the Four Year Plan after knov/ledgc of the above, are outlined in
detail in our brief, KOERI^E also had special Icnov/ledgc of tlie
planning for the Russian aggression. He was Goering's deputy
in the Economic Leadership Staff East, which engaged in the
planning and e-^loitation of Russia. This activity'- constitutes
as to Russia, participation in the "planning, preparation or
initiation of aggressive war". As to the other Allied porvers
at ViTar TJith Germany, it constitutes participation in the "vraging
of aggressive war". The evidence sliov/s that the planning involved
the utilization of the industrial potential of Russia for the
further waging of aggressive vfar already in existence.
In 19ij.2, KOIilRI'IER became a member of the Central Planning
Board, This agency, among other things, determined the "requirements"
and overall allocation of slave labor. There were originally three
members of this board, namely, Speer, liilch and KOmNER. In 19i;3
Funlc vras added. For the participation in the activities of the
Central planning Board relating to the slave labor program, Speer,
Milch and Funk have been found guilty. KCERIOT is the remaining
member of the Board. It is important to note that KOERNER had
knowledge that the utilization of slave labor was part of the
program for waging aggressive v^ar, and that ho participated in
the execution of that program. Because of his knoirlcdgc of the
program, and its use as an instrumentality for vfaging xrar, KOERflER
is not only guilty of Mar Crimes and Grimes against Humanity in
connection with his slave labor activities, but his participation
in this program also establishes his guilt for Crimes against Peace,
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One year before Hitler seized pov/er^ KEPPIiER became Hitler's
Economic Advisor, and in Iviarch 1933 he was appointed Hitler's
Deputy for Economic Questions« Shortly thereafter, he was given
a special assignment by Hitler to biiild up the German raw material
base, particularly in the field of strategic military materials.
i
Thus he laid the foundation for Germany's main industrial capacity
for synthetic rubber, synthetic fuel, synthetic fats and
^ s^mthetic fibers. His overall participation is vrell described
by IffiPPIER. He testified:
"Frequently Gooring ordered me to report to him and on
these occasions I had to give him a very lengthy and
♦ detailed report concerning the work that I had done up
to that stage. In addition to that, Gooring was
absolutely satisfied in every respect vrith the v/ork
that I had done up to that tir.ie. ... Goering was roaliy
a personality if one had personal contact with him.^J He told me very frankly that after all he hjjn5_elf_ didn' t
« knowVsin'^le" thih'g about' oc'cncSy, and lie ordort^d. me^to ^^
carry ^rTliy work onVlnu'ch~^aFg^Tcale.fTr.p. l9Ji3> I931u)
In connection with ICEPPIlE's appraisal of Goering, it is
intorosting to note that Gooring frankly admitted that ho (Gooring)
did not kncfvf a thing about econony. This is a significant statement
. in vieiv of the defense which KOERNSR interposed to the effect that
Goering was the sole responsible person in connection with the
operation of the Four Year Plan and that ho, KOERNSR, merely was
his advisor without authority or responsibility.
KEPPIER was an expert in essential specialized fields, and 'the
record shovTs "that his participation in those fields was substantial
and of great importance to further the economic mobilization for war,
ICEPPLER's Bureau for Geri.ian Raw IMaterials and Synthetics was
incorporated in October 193^ into Goering's Four Year plan. KEPPLEr
was present at the conforoncos preceding the creation of the Four
Year Plan,. One significant conference, to which we call attention,
is that of 26 Jlay 1936 vhen Goering addressed his group of experts
stating that he was opposed to aiy financial limitations on war
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production and that all measures vfero to be considered from the
standpoint of an assured T/a,ging of "".Tar.
KEPPLSR, like KOERNER, had special knowledge of "the military-
character of the Four Year Plan. He, too, was informed by Goering,
prior to the public aruiouncement by Hitler of the Four Year Plan,
of the contents of Hitler's secret memorandum of August 1936. He
was present at the meeting when Goering confidentially informed
those present of tho military nature of the plan in connection with
the preparations for war. ICEPPLFR's participation thereafter must
be viewed from this very significant fact relating to knOTrlodgc.
"fithin the Four Year Plan, IGDPPLER wns appointed to the Council of
Ministers as the expert on sjmthotic and ravr materials.
As to kno\'/lcdgo, a comparison vm.th tho Farbon Case shoves that
it vras KEPPIER who negotiated ^/ith I.G. Farben with respect to the
construction of the synthetic rubber plants. It is apparent that
ICEPPIiliK cannot bo believed when ho stated tlmt he participated in
setting up the synthetic rubber program as a measure of peacetime
econoity, since he was informed by Goering of the contents of Hitler's
secret memorandum regarding tho Four Year Plan,
The record show's that prior to the time vjhen Goering informed
I^EPPLYR of Hitler's secret memorandum, ICEPPLER discussed the
synthetic rubber program directly with Hitler and that I^PPIER acted
as Hitler's Deput^r when discussing this program with the Army and
the Finance Unistry. The record also shows that after Sop'tomber
1936 I®ppiER acted as liaison bct7/Gcn tho Four Year Plan, tho Arry
and the I.G. Farboa. Thus, an official report stated:
"On 7 October, tho Chief of the Military Economic Staffj informed Mr, KEPPLER that in viov/ of tho now rubber
program which como within tho Four Year Plan ho had
no objection to tho capacity of the three giant plants
. to be croctod being increased -jhhj-," (Exh.2710,Doc .No.,
NI-ii7135Doc.Book lUO, E#p.l2)
In 1937, IISPPLER attended tho mooting vd-tli Gooring T-^ioro the
discussion vrith respect to increasing production of iron took place.
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As a result of this discussion, the Hermann Goering "'"''Grks vrore
set up to exploit loiT-grade iron ore, ICEPPLER was appointed to
the Aufsichtsrat of the Hermann Goering 'Torks. All this
occurred at a time when ICEPPLSR had special knowledge of the
military objectives of tliis econorirLc preparation,
of
In the beginning/1938, KEPPLER also became engaged in
other activities which gave him special knov/ledge of tlie aggressive
cnaractor of the planning. He v.'as appointed Secretary of State
t in the Foreign Office and vras assigned special tasks in connection
with the-preparations for the accomplislimGnt of the Austrian
^Uischluss, As the pillars of Austrian sovereignty shook, KEPPIFR
> increased the teii^o of Nasi demands. It was IfEPp™ who backed
up Hxtlor's threats informing rAiaas that 200,000 GorTiian
^ soldiers wore being assembled at the Austrian border, ready for
j invasion.
Ho hiriTsclf has described in part the nature and extent of
his participation in Austria before the Anschluss, In a letter
^ to oeyss-inquart, dated 30 June 1938, ICSPPLER stated;
Field yarshal Goering charged
extensive work ^vlth the Hermann Goering 'lorks
^dotncr^industrial enterprises of the State. I
yi ^ ^ first big assignment by Ribbentrop,
T hn + i^-portant, but difficult affair, which
+h I settle under strictest confidence, riiich,
suitable for a publication in the
F 7 just came back fro.ii the Foreign Office
I inspected future offices. I will have toconduct my office activities in various buildings,
^ bccausG my office remains rJiore it vras." (3x^1.2717,
Doc,No.njD-1U9?9, Doc.Book ll40,F.p,73)
KEPPLHR i>''as GoriXi.ny's chief agent in carrying out special
-j. research projects in the countries which wore to be invaded. After
the munich Agreement, Goering made a speech on Hi October 1933,
* The report states;
oxploitod with all the
fhn n* Field Jiarshal Goering counts upon
r^tnh assimilation of the Slovakias.T7 olova^a rrould become German dominions,possible rmist be taken out. The Oder and
m'T t-n speeded up. Searches for ore andoil h..ve to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by StateSecretary KEPPLER," (Sxh,971,Doc.No.l301-PS,Doc.Bk.ll8,E,p.265)
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Can it bo seriously urged that KSPPLJIR was not informGd of the
aggressive plans against Czcchoslovalcia?
There is a verjr significant fact in connection with ISPPIER's
activities, and that is tlie ^timing" of his various tasks. He
appears in Austria just before the invasion. ^Then that is an
accomplished fact, he moves on to a special job in Czechoslovakia.
Tien that country is taken over, he moves on to southeastern
Europe. It is more than coincidence that he was in the vanguard
even before a number of tlie aggressions were launched.
PLEIGER
PLSIGSR operated in a specialised industrial field - coal,
iron and stoel. His activity in those fields was substantial and
contributed directly and significantly to the industrial and
economic mobilization for aggressive vfar. Here again, participation
in this specialized sector was with knowledge of the military
objectives of the programs in which ho participated,
His early start in connection wiih, tlie economic mobilization
was in the KEPFTER Bureauo He was tho top export in "the Iron
Department of tho Office for Goman Raw and Synthetic liatcrials.
As early as 1936, PLEIGER T;as sufficiently important to bo called
^ by Goering in tho mooting of the select group of cjfports. Ho
heard Goering's novT wcll-laiovni address of 26 May 1936 in irhich the
problems in connection vfitli vrar mobilization wore discussed, "fith
the promulgation of tlio Pour loar Plan PLEIGER, like lOSPPLSR, wont
ovor to GooringTs office. Thereafter, PLEIGER participated in
i^hy important meetings whoro- th© fuiidamontals of the Four Year
Plan production program wore planned in detail.
On 17 March 1937, he ivas present at a nootijtig where Gooring
opened the discussion vdth those v;ords:
"This may well be tho most important session concornin
the Four Year Plan dealing ivith tiic questions of tho
iron and stcol production, its output, capacity, supply
of rav;- materials and iron distribution. Primarily''
involved is Gorman oro procuroncnt, Lack of ore
?^t not endanger the program of munitionrTupply or
•G
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of arinanients in case of \7ar. Everything possible
mast be undertaken on the part of the Gorman firms
and the State mast take ovor when German firms have
proven themselves no longer able to carry on."
The Hermann Goeririg "forks was the brainchild of PLEIGER, not
of Goering. This he proudly admitted when ho testified:
"I was firmly convinced that the iron and stool
situa?br6n~was"~OTe which was bound to'liiterest Goering,
as Plenipotentiary for tlie Four Year Plan. ... so, in
ny opinion, the sTtaatibn was very favorable and I
t decided that I would by-pass the official channels,
through Office chief Loeb and State Secretary KOSRira,
and approach Goering directly •••• I had ... a short
• . memorandum submitted to Goering, in his capacity as
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year plan ... It contained
all the arguments by which I might hope to rouse Goering »s
• interest. That is why I pointed out that the plant was of
military importance l)ecausc we" woFe~lLrmiig^ all along the
ISie, tho foreign currency questionj especially, hovrover,
I made it clear to him what it would mean if there should
be a minors* strike in Sweden, when in only three months
^ tho whole German industry would come to a standstill.
The ore stocks at that time amovintod to not over a four
week's supply. It was a situation for me by which I •
^ould make Goering take" a bite" out "of the soiir apple.
There couTdn't have been a more favorable argument."j (Tr.litSoS, 1U80U)
In July 1937 the announcement of the founding of the Hermann Goering
Uorks was mado. PESIGER's participation in tlie setting up of this
instrumentality and his utilization of tho Hermann Goering "^orks
for tho development of a vrLder base for iron ore and iron, is fully
disclosed bj'* the record.
The only question presented as we see it is whether PEEIGER
had knovfledge of the military objectives in connection with this
matter. Pron all the evidence, the record is clear that he did
have such knoi-rledgo-. He acquired further insight in the planning
.j.
to take over the Austriaji deposits in tho J'A" case. Ho was present
at a meeting of 1? imroh 1937> along with KOIildlER and KEPPLER^ when
' • Goering statedj
"It is 3japorta,nt that tho soil of Austria is reckoned
as part of Gorraany in case of war. Such deposits as
can be acquired in Austria must be attended to in order
to increase oi^ supply capacity. -JHHf supply for native
^ which 3J1 A-Pall rocoipt^ fir.-m Austriavrlth all hoi- possibilities are to be added -JHHf lu
case A one could count on 6 million tqRs per ye^' from
Aus fcr la. »< (Exh,966,NI-090,Bk.118b,p•229).
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iHis participation in the preparations for the e:qploitation of
industrial property in Czechoslovakia appears fron the fact, anong
other things, that the 'n'itkawitz Iron and Steel plant in Boheiuia
and Moravia which was occupied on lii March 1939, the day prior to
the full scale invasion of Czechoslovakia, vfas imrnediately taken
over by a board to control and operate the plant for the Reich.
The Chairman of that board was PLEIG5R. The board was dominated
by the Hermann Goering TTorks. PLEK^, when asked whether he was
aware of such acquisitions, answered; "I don't think there was any
acquisition about the carrying out of which- I did not know,"
(Tr.p.l5329)
In connection 7d.th the spoliation activities of PUSIGER in
Czechoslovakia, Poland, France and Russia, the details are set
forth in our briefs, re also emphasize that PIEIG3R's activity in
acquisition of industrial property in occupied territories
matches similar activity by Roechling. have already pointed out
that as to Roechling the General Tribunal in the French Zone held
that ihis constituted the waging of aggressive war -ivithin the meaning
i of the Control Council Law No.10. TTe ask for a similar finding with
respect to PLEIGER.
^ PLEIGER's activities in connection vfith slave labor on behalf
of the Hermann Goering 7orks and on behalf of the Reich Coal
Association, are detailed in our brief. The evidence shows that he
bad knowledge of the program regarding the utilization of slave
f labor as an instrumentality for the waging of war, and he
substantially participated in carrying that program but. In
^.ddition to constituting 'Tar Crimes and Crimes against Humanity,
J particular activity of PLEIGER constitutes tJio v/aging of wars
aggression under the moaning of Control Council Law No.lO.
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/jnong the many and varied fields which of necessity must be
regimented in mobilizing a national econcn^r for war^ food is of
major importance* The defendant Richard TITalter D/iRRE is responsible
for mobilizing the agricultural and food resources of Germany, for
developing the war important i^utarchy program of the Four Year Plan,
and for formulating plans to acquire the food resources of
European countries for the purpose of preparing for and waging
aggressive war,
DiiRRE's general knovrlodge of Hitler ^s aggressive objectives
is the result of his early association vri.th the Nazi Party* His
membership in the NSDAP date-s from 1930; his membership in the SS.
dates from 1931* Directly following Hitler's seizure of power in
1933, D/iRRE v/as appointed a Reichsleitor, thus becoming one of tlie
seventeen members of the hoirarchy of the Nazi, party. At. the same
time he acquired the high and responsible government position of
Reich lUnister of Food and Agriculture, Later ho v/as appicinted
by Hitler as the Reich peasant Leader. In his field, his position
and his functions are analagous to those of Funk in economic
mobilization.
D/iRRE, as a member of Hitler's Cabinet, signed the lavr
restoring the '"ohrnacht in 1935* D/JIRE, in conjunction vrith the
Plenipotentiary General for the 'Tar Econory, drafted plans relative
to mobilizing the Gorman Food Economy f or v/ar. The purpose jt&s to
make available all of the economic forces necessary to the conduct
of war. In the month following the Hossbach Conference of November
1937, DxiRRE prepared a coiiTprehonsivo program relating to the
organization of the 'Tar Food Econoiry, Ho also issued the administra
tive decrees relating to tlio goveriviont control of agricultural
products, according to this plan, all vitally ir^ortant fo.ydstuffs
were to bo covered by a systGn of ratic^ning certificates. This was
effected by DARRE's "DocrGe on the Safeguarding of the ?ital Necessities
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of the German People". This decree, and its supplementing
legislation, was put into effect four days before the polish
aggression,
/liter the invasion of Austria, D/JIRE perfected his plans for
mobilizing Germany's agricultural economy for war. On 8 September
1938, DARRE, as llinistcr of Food and Agriculture, and Frick, .as
Reich liLnistcr of Interior, issued a secret order calling for an
acceleration in the work of their subordinate agencies engaged in
mobilizing the Food Economy. This order stated araong other things:
"Since tlio Fuelirer and Reich Chancellor has ordered
the preparation for econonic nobilizatiDn to be speeded
up, one of iiio nest urgent tasks of the loading
officials in charge of the Gstablishr.iont 01 the war food
offices, •vn.ll be to comience immediately, if they have
not already done so, the preliminary work according to
the mobilization calendar and to insure its speedy
completion by the temporary assignment of assistant
workers. The deadline is 1^ October 1938."
>. At the same tiae that this order for accelerated mobilization
was issued, secret decrees were prepared and signed tfj'" D/xRRE, definii
the particular field of activity of various Reich agencies that wore
concerned iTith the questi..ns of food and agriculture. Those
* regulations, among other things, contain the detailed provisions for
tho conduct of activities during the first four weeks after the
^ outbreak of war. In addition, provision vras ioado for regulating
tho Food Economy during tho course of war.
D/iRRE set up tho adiainistrativo machinery and pro^vided hinse]!
mth a uniform, closely Imit organization- This made it possible
w for hin to control and direct completely tho food supply'" of tho
armed forces and civilian population.
The timing of D/JlRE's orders in relation to the threatened
i invasion of Czechoslovakia is significant. D/JtRE's activities
i:.Tmediatoly prior to tho aggressi on against Bohemia and lloravia
again shovr that ho had knowledge of tho aggressive character of
his measures designed to further continuing aggression by Germany,
It was only a month before the invasion of B'.>hemia and Moravia
that D/»RRE directed a survey of the food supply situation for the
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express purpose of controlling and directing that supply during
war. This order vras issued by D;dlHE on February 1939- During a
D/JIHS/Goering conference in February 1939^ relating to the
I
preparation measures respecting the grain situation, Goering put
to DARPiE the question of the absolute mininun of grain necdod as a
national reserve in, order t'^ be prepared for the occurrence of
tI:io "A" Case. D '^JIRE had the ansvfor: A grain reserve of at least
six million tons was required. The purpose of the grain storage
program imdertaken to reach that huge figure assumes further
^ significance, by virtue of the fact tiaat at the time of the attack
against Poland, D,»'*RPtE had succeeded in accumulating a war grain
roservo exceeding the six nillion ten figure.
* On 27 August 1939 Dx'tRHE issued a decree vrhich put into effect
the food ration plans Tvhich he had theretofore prepared. Details
"the rationing program for the first four weeks of the war
included the issuance of ration cards and the detailed administra
tion of T/artime fo.xl controls. The same day, 27 August 1939,
issued another decroo setting into notion the administrative
^ agonoies entrusted with the allocation and administration of t!io
food econoi:y on a wartime basis. However^ they had been secretly
drafted and signed a year before vd.th the Intention of issuitir then
if the throats against Czechoslovakia produced v/ar. In August 1939
it was plain to IL'iHHE and the other Reich Ministers that Case "A'*
was nL"Jw at hand. The decrees vrero issued.
t That DiiRRE knew his preparations in this particular field were
for the waging of aggressive wax' is oloar. Shortly aftor the
^ invasion of Poland, ho made a report to Georing and to Hitler, dated
Iif 29 November 1939, which stated in part:
"The whole work of agrarian policy since the seizure of
pOTror was already dordna'tod by tlio preparation for a
possible xrar The fact that Germanj'- could in this war
sot Its supply position as desired despite the heavy
do;-.iands on agriculture for a period of many years,
one primarily to the efforts of the agrarian sector
in the battle on production. Henceforth the issue depends
insuring cand maintaining t'l the vd-dest possible extent
the degrees of intensity already att<ainod. (Exli-lOiiS,
NG-W3,DB-102,p.109).
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D/kRRE's activities arc ro'solvGd briefly in the short sentence
vrliich he r/rote after the v#ar -vras under way?
"In a ^'igantic effort before 1939} I created the
requisite vjhich no.de it p ssible for the Fuehrer
to wage this war at all fro:.i the point of vioTj- of
food," (Fxh.l0U8jHlP-12720^Doc,Bk,102,p,126).
•"e turn now to the discussion of Crimes and CrioiGs against
Humanity,
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COUNT III
V/AB. Ci-Il'ISS: MURDER hlW ILL TREATMENT OF
BSLLlCrERENTS AND PRISONERS OF UAR.
In June 1945 a U.S. Military Comriiission was
arraigned to try the German civilian - Peter Back- He
was charpccd with having violated
"the laws and useges of war by willfullyj
deliberately, and feloniously killing an
Amoricfin airman, name rnd rank unknown, a
member of the Allied Forces, who had iDgira-
chuted to earth at said tine and place in
hostile territory and was then v/ithout any
means of defense".
The Commission found Back guilty as charged and imposed
death sentence on him. (2559-PS, Exh. C-245, Bk.216).
Tho case of this German civilian was by no means an
isolated one, A great mrjiy German civilians were tried
and convicted after the war by U.S. and British Courts
HfOrtial for having mistreated and murdered defenseless
allied soldiers who had been forced to bail out of their
disabled planes and Is.nd on German territory. The Geivnan
civilians who were thus brought to justice paid the
supreme penalty, the sentence of death, bec<ausc they
were murderers. But they v/ere only the trigger men,
turned into murderers by the leaders who had encourr.g:ed
and incited them to commit murder by x^^omising them
impunity. The systciicatic slaying of allied soldiers by
the German populace was the direct result of a vicious
scheme which wa.s evolved and x^'romoted by the highest
governmental agencies of the Third Reich. The record
reveals that the defendr.nts LAJ^d'ERS, DIETRICH, and RITTER
pla,yed a consiJicuous part in this scheme.
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AThe International Military Tribunal held,tha-t:
I'/hen Allied adrnon wore forced to land in G-erna,ny
they were sonetimes killed at once by the civilian
IDopula.tion. The Police v/ere instructed not to
interfere with the-se killings, and the Ministry
of Justice wa-s informed thad no one should be
X)rosecuted for talcing part in them,'' (Trial
of Major War "Criminals, Vol. I, p. 229).
This was the officia.l policy.
The evidence v/hich the Prosecution ha.s submitted in
supi^ort of the further charges in Count III of the Indict
ment is very extensivb- We shall not adtcnpt today to
describe again the terrible events which the documentary
evidence so eloquently portrays. The facts establishing
the criminal responsibility of each defendant under
Count III v^ill be outlined in detail in the individual
briefs.
It is well established by the laws of war that a
defenseless enemy who surrenders to the mercy of the
victor shall not be killed or wounded, but shall be
talcen an a prisoner. This principle is embodied in
Article 23 of the Hague Convention. Equally revered is
the rule that prisoners shall be humanely treated as
embodied in Articles 4 through 20 of the Hague Re^uln.—
tions and the G-eneva Convention of 1929.
Tho orlraea oommlttecl against prisoners of war have
been established by the IMT;
"Prisoners of v/a.r were ill-treated and
and murdered, not only in defiance of e ^
established rules of international law,
complete disregard of the elemontaxy die c.
of humanity." (IMT, p.227).
The defendant BERCER was responsible as Chief of
Prisoner of Wsjr Affairs for such crimes. After 1 October
-74-
\ •'!
...->3
'A
'I-
••'li'
1944, he was at the apex of the chain of coranandi One of
the most disgraceful acts committed in this connection
was t|ie brutal murder of the French G-eneral Iviesny, a
prisoner of war in Gerraan custody^ This is not the first
time that the Mesny case has come to the s.ttontion of the
Nurnberg Tribuns.ls. In finding the defendant KibbentroiD
guilty of the comnission of War Grimes and Crimes against
Humanity the IMT said;
"in December 1944 Von Hibbentrop was informed of
the plans to murder one of the French genercols
held as a prisoner of war and directed his sub
ordinates to see that the datails wore worhecl
out in such a way as to prevent its detection
by the protesting pov;ors-" (II'IT, p. 287).
In finding the dcfendoait Kaltenbrunner guilty of the
coraraisslon of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, the
XI.5T said:
"In December 1944 Kaltenbrunner participated in
the murder of one of the French generals held
as a prisoner of war." (lIvIT, p.292).
At the time the plot to murder General liosny was conceived
and continuing to the time it was actually carried out,
BERGEH was Chief of the Office of PW Affairs. He Knew of
the insidious plan from the very start and it was BEHGER
who picked General Mesny to be murdered in accordance with
the plan. The defendants STEENGHACHT and HITTER participated
in the cover-up in order to prevent its detection by the
protecting powers, and by the civilized world at lar^.e.
The killing of confined prisoners, as well as forced
mei^ches of prisoner's was also carried out In direct viola
tion of the laws and customs of wa.r. Under the provision
of this policy, tjce defendants of the Foreign Office were
fully advised and prepared "cover up" diplomatic notes to
the protective powers upon inquiry.
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No defense, and no mitigating eircumstanceS) can
be a.dduced in conneption with these a.pts, The defendants
in this case ane more culpably responsible and deserve
no less punishment for such crimes than the German
soldiers and civilians who have been sentenced to death
for enforcing the murder policy transmitted to- them
from a.bove.
'4.'lA'//.
I:
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COUNT V
HAR CRBIES AND CRIMES A&AINST KUI'IANITY: ATROCITIESOFFENSES_COMriTTSD_ACAlNST_CIV^LIAN POPULATIONS
Count V of the indictment charges certain defendants
with criminal responsibility for atrocities and offenses
committed against civilian populations. The criminal con
duct involved under these charges is so wide sweeping that
f
we make no extended comment here. The defendants are charged
v/ith criminal particiiDa.tion, under the requisites of crimi
nal responsibility set forth in Article 2, Control Council
Law No.10, for the following, among other types of con
duct; The systematic evacuation of non-G-ermans from their
homes and the resettlement of non-O-erraan areas by so-called
"ethnic" G-ermans; the forcible "G-ex'manization" of persons
of foreign nationality who were thought to fulfill the
mystic standards of so-called "racial" G-crmans; the de
portation to forced labor, the confinement in concentra
tion cami^s and the millions of cases of liquidation of those
• persons who were not found to fulfill the mystic standards
of alleged racial G-ermans; the forced resettlement into
the Tvaffen SS of prisoners of war and civllie^ns of military
age from countries overrun by the ViTehrraacht; the use of a
perverted judicial process as a weapon for the suppression,
persecution and extermination of opponents of the Nazi
occupation and of alleged "inferior peoples"; the ariest,
imprisonment, doporta,tion and murder of so-called hostcges;
the x^ersecution, torture and extermination of the Jevfs v/ho
fell into the clutches of Nazi Germany with each succeeding
aggression and the planning and the execution of a program
to exterminate all surviving European Jews beginning in
the winter of 1941 and 1942; the deprivation of civil
r
ights and the expropriation of the property of Austrii'ns,
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Czechs, Poles and other nationals in the occupied countries;
and the receipt, conversion and disposal for the benefit-
of G-ormans or the G-orman Reich all properties taken from
the victims subject to extermination-
Goncerning these crimes, no new legal problem cesx
be. raised here. The law is clear". Except where the defen
dants ha.ve claimed non-involvement, which we will answer
in our briefs, the overall defense has been to claim
superior orders or what has variously been termed as
necessity, duress or compulsion. This general defense
will be discussed later.
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CCIWT SIX - FLin-IPr^R Am SFCLIATjON
Under Count 3ix of the Indictment very extensive chiarges have been
made, based upon a v;ide range of conduct by the defendants in dealing
"With di-vBrse kinds of property in t'ne several economies of the occupied
territories. It is well beyond the compass of the closing argument to
consider each legal issue yhich has been raised or is essentially in
volved in these charges. Detailed analysis of the legal principles appli-
cable to these kinds of international crimes has been offered in a
separate brief upon the subject. Here we shall discuss only certain
genoral questions of law.
The principal issues involved in the cases of alleged spoliation, it
seems to the Prosecution, are:
(1) Do the laws and customs of ivar apply to invasions and occupa
tions pursuant to acts of ag^^ression, such as the invasions and occupa
tions of Austria, the so-called Sudetenland, and the so-called Protecto
rate of Bohemia and Moravia,
(2) Do general standards governing the conduct of belligerent occu
pation exist? If so, what are the limitations on the conduct of the
occupant in the course of belligerent occupation?
(3) Under what conditions is the belligerent occupant entitled to
exercise authority over property in the occupied territory under the
obligation to maintain public order and.safety?
(i|) «/hat protections are afforded to private property in occupied
territory and under what circumstances do these protections disappear?
(5) Do the laws and customs of war limit the belligerent occupant
in dealing with public, or state—o^med,properties?
(6) For what forms of participation in spoliation is the Individual
defendant criminally responsible?
(7) Is there a special right to violate the provisions of the Hague
Convention in the case of "military necessity" such that the belligerent
occupant may generally exploit the occupied territories in furtherance
of the waging of war?
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(8) Can the defendants be held criiiiinally responsible for the
spoliation of property in cases n"here they have invested additional
capital in the seized or adninistered enterprises such that, regardless
of remoTOls of capital stock and equipment, the total value of the- pro
perty has increased.
(l) Austria and Czechoslovakia
It is contended by the Tefense that the rules governing belligerent
occupation cannot be applied to the territories of Austria, the "Sudeten-
land"^ and Bohemia-Moravia because these territories were occupied TYithout
the "VYaging of actual hostilities. But the evidence in this case and the
determinations and findings of the International Slilitary Tribunal estab
lish conclusively that the occupations of each of these areas y/as a
direct consequence of the threat of force or the use of force on the part
of the Geiman State, That is, the invasion and occupation of each of
these territories yras an act of ag-ression. In e-.ch case German forces
massed upon the frontiers of the ccuntiy; in each case ultiirata were
delivered^ in each case "voluntary" accession of the government of -the
t occupied territories was obtained through coercion; in each case the
territory was declared to have become a part of the German Reich in
^ substance; and in each case the occupation was a part of an aggressive
plan. In truth, as Lord flalifax has said, referring to such invasions
and occupations, "wars without declarations of Tvar" occurred, (Bocr.ments
Concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities
Betv/een Great Britain and Germany on 3 September 1939t Foreign Office,
Misc. No, 9 (1939)5 London, HiSO, p. 15^) T/lien the general European con-
^ flict was v/aged, the Allied States proclaimod, as this Tribunal may
judicially notice, that the liberation and reconstruction of the frontiers
of Austria and Czechoslovakia v/ere included within war aims. Allied
armies were in the field contesting on behalf of the true governments
and the populations of these lands,
in determining the applicability of the laws and customs of vfar to
the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, the International Military
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%Tribunal found that a hostile occupation by force or the threat of force
is governed by the traditional laws of war:
"Bohemia and Moravia were occuoied by military force, Hacha's
consent, obtained as it was b^^ duress, canuot be considered as
justifying the occupation . . . The occupation of Bohemia and .
Moravia must therefore be considered n military occupation
coverod by the rules of warfare. Although Czechoslovakia was
not a party to the Hague Convention of I907, the rule s of land
warfare expressed in this Convention are declaratory of e:dsting
International law and hence are applicable,"!/
Furthermore, in judging the crlninality of the SA, the Interna' ional
I/iilitary Tribunal indicated adherence to the principle that occupatiou.s
pursuant to acts of aggression are governed by the rules of xjar. The
judgment at this point very definitely ijnplies that the occupation of
both Austria and the Sudetenland could and did give rise to vmr crimes
and crimes against humanity:
"Isolated units of tte SA were even involx''od in the steps
leading up to aggressive v/ar and in the commission of War
Crimes and Ci-imes against Iiumanit3% SA units were among
the first in the occupation of Austria in K'arch 1932, The
SA supplied many of the men and a large part of the equinment
which composed the Sudeten Free Cores of Heulein , . U
The judgment of the I3;.T appears to be quite explicit in meaning.
Hit if any doubt should eiclst, it is iUll3^ dispelled in the analysis of
the judgment by Bormedieu de Vabres, French member on the Tribunal.
Observing that the Tribunal convicted von Schirach of crimes against
humanity in Austria, and that such crimes had to be linked ^-d-th crinies
against peace or war crimes, according to the general principle of the
Tribunal, de Vabres explained:
"Tliat is to say that the occupation of Austria being the
effect of an aggressive act assinila.ted by the Tribunal to
the character of a war operation^ the designation 'v/ar crime' .
is applicable to common law crimes ccrnimitted on its territory,"^
ITe aibmit that the judgment of tlic International Military Tribunal
^stains the position of the FrosGciition and that the determination of
the BIT on this point is controlling under Article X of Ordinance 7,
1/ Tilal of I.kij or War Criminalsj Vol. p, 33J4,
£/ Trial of Major War Criminals', Vol. I, p. 27I4,
3/ de Vabres, The Judgment of Hurembcrr; and the FrnnM nTo nf T.Pc-PlU-r n^p
Offenses-and Penalties, "Review of PonaJ. Law "HHd of Criminology",'
Brussels, July I9h7, as translated by J, HorJsson pp lii-l5.
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Thero is nothing novel in the idea that a '^belligerent occupation'i,
that is, an occupation governed by tho rules of the Hague Convention of
1907, such as "to give rise to war crimes, may exist in the absence of
actual amod hostilities. As Quincy Vfright has stated, , tho law of
• war has been held to apply to interventions, invasions, aggressions and
other \ises of armed force in foreign territories even when there is no
1/
state of war ..."
Ug conclude that war crimes did arise in la?/ in the German occupa'
tion of Austria, the Sudetenland, and Eohemia-Horavia,
(2) General Standards
Th^ Prosecution submits that the specific la?;s and customs of war
regula|)ing the belligerent occupant in his conduct wiii) regard to various
kinds of property in the occupied territories express particular appli
cations of general principlos and standards ivhich govern belligerent
occupation. These principles require that the occupant may not (l)
exploit the occupied territory beyond the needs of the army of occupa-
tioni (2) drain the occupied territory beyond the resources of the
cconomyi (3) disregard the needs of tho inhabitants; or (ii) utilise
industries in the occupied territory for the furtherance of war production.
From a consideration of several of the articles of the Hague Regu
lations, the International Military Tribunal concluded:
. . under the rules of v;ar, the economy of an occupied
countiy can only be roquirod to bear the expense of the occu
pation, and these shaild not be greater than tho economy of
the countiT can reasonably be Gxpectcd to bear."£/i ry
-Similar principles wore applied in the Krupp Case (Case 6). To
quote frcm the judgment:
"... the economic substance of the belligerentlc'' occupied
territory must not be taken over by the occupant or put to the
service of his war effort - alvrays mth the proviso that there
are exemptions from this rule wliich arc strictly limited to the
needs of tho army of occupation insofar as such needs do not
exceed the economic strength of the occupiod territory," ^
1/ Q, "Tright, "Airerican Journal of International Lav;", Jan. 19k7i Vol. Ijl^
p. 61,
^ Trial of Major Tar Criminals,.Vol. I, p. 239.
^ Opinion and Judgment, Case 10, p, 20.
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And further:
. . if as a result of y/ar action, a belligerent occupies
territory of the adversary, he docs thereby, acquire the
right to dispose of the property in that territory, except
according to the strict rules laid do>ai in the Regulations,
he economy of the belligerently occupied territory is to be
icopt intact, except for the carefully defined permissions
given to the occupying authority - permissLons which all refor
to the army of occupation. Just as the inhabitants of the
occupied torritory^must not be forced to help tho enemy in
waging the war against their own cointi^r or their opn country* s
allies, so must the economic assats of the occupied territory
not be used in such a manner." "hi
The General Tribunal at Rastatt, in the Case against Heimann
Rqo ch_.ing and Others, found tho defendant Hermann Roechling guilty of
spoliation in that, among other things, he utilized French steel enter
prises "for the purpose of bringing aboutj at tho expense of the occupied
country, the maximum increase in the war potential of thie Reich." ^
These standards are set forth explicitly in several Articles of the
Hc^gue Regulations and thoy have long boon recognized la the writings
of emlnont jurists such as Garner, Oppenheim, and Feilchenfeld, who
have considered the subject.
Hiero requisitions or confiscations of specific articles are in-
volvGd in the facts of Case 11, the Tribunal may well look to the precise
and controlling ArtidLos of the Hague Regulations. But when, in addition,
(--st progrc.ras for the exploitation of the occupied territories are shov/n
to have been conceived or oxocuted or aided by tho defendants, such pro
grams should be judged ly tho fundamental principles of the Convention,
rather than its detail. This was the standard applied by the Inter
national Ililitary Tribunal in parallel cases,
(3) Fubiic Order and Safety
Article li3 of the Hague Regulations provides!
'^ 'The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed
xnto the fends of the occupant, the latter shall take all the
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country,"
3/ Opinion and Judgment, Case 10, p, 19*
2/ Opinion and Judgment, Roechling Case, p. 2lj.
-83-
.*1
111
JiAv' •".
This Article pemits the occupying porrar io cjcpropiuatc or seize either
puhlic or private property where necessary to preserve public order and
safety. Accordingly, if private property is abandoned, the occupying
poivcr may take possession to insure that the property is not destroyed
and to re-establish employment. The occupying poTOr is required in such
a case to treat this possession as a conservatory for the rightful
cnvners' interest,
j Pablic property, which of necessity mast be abandoned by the legi
timate power, may also be taken over and operated by the occupant for
the same reasons. The necessity for protecting the occupation forces
against the dangers of attack may further justify certain types of
seizures or o:x:propriation in the interest of public order and safety
under Article Bit this particular phase of securing public order
and safety is provided for more spccificaHy in other parts of tho
Hague RoEulations.
ij
The oiq^ropriation of property, whether public or private, when
required by public order and safety, i.n no vray authorizes the use of suoh
property in violation of the over-all prohibitions against using the
property of the enemy territory for noods other than those of tho occu-
* pation. Seizure v;hich is found nocossary for the protection of public
ordor and safety may legitimately be followed only by such action as
^ serves to maintain public order and safety against the threat which
occasioned seizure, "/here property has been taken over under circum
stances which make it clear that these requirements vrcre not tho moti
vating factor, or even considered as reason, the taker cannot later be
heard to say that his deed was justified by the needs of public order
and safety. To illustrate, seizure of property to provide for German
^ economic and war needs belies a later claim In the course of cri.minal
proceedings that the property was seized under Article ii3.
'•'hile Article ii3 authorizes and requires the occupant to maintain
public order and safety, it also limits his activities. The restriction
is contained in the clause v/hich requires the occupant to respect the
lav/s in force in the occupied territory unless absolutely prevented,
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This provision simply roflects one of the basic standards of the Hague
Convention — that personal and private ri^ts of persons in the occu
pied territory shall not be infrin:3ed except as justified by emergency
conditions. The occupant is forbidden from imposing his orm tastes in
municipal Ian. Enactments by the Goman occupation authorities uhich
nere designed to propagate Nazi racial theories very surely cannot be
justified by the necessities of public order a nd safety.
'.Thcro discriminatory lans are passed v:hich affect the property
rights of private Individuals^ subsequent transactions involving such
property have been repeatedly hold to be violations of both Article Ii3
and Article I46. For example, the i^rupp Tribunal found criminal the
lease of a building in Paris from an aryanization "trustee", without
more.
(h) Private Property
The basic provision of the Hague Regulations dealing vdth private
property is Article h6, which provides:
"Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice
must be respected.
"Private property cannot bo confiscated."
The requirement that private property must be respected is, of
course, a broader protection for the inhabitants of the occupied terri
tories than ths prohibition against confiscation. Violation of this
protection need not reach the extrcmG of confiscation. Under this
article, we submit, interference Y/ith any of the normal incidents of
enjoyment of quiet occupancy and use Is forbidden. Such incidents
Include, among other things, the right to personal possession or
operation, control of the purpose for i/hich the property is to bo used^
disposition of the property, and the right to the enjoyment of the
incorao derived from the property. Certainly the protections of Article
I46 are subject to excoptions, contained in the Hague Regulations them
selves, in tho Article on public order n.nd safety already considered
and in the Articles governing the right of tho occupant to requisition.
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Hit the exceptions do not permit actions -rhich constitute a complete dis
possession of the ornior, or the use of the propert:/ simply for tho
benefit of persons other than tho ovmer, or the exploitation of the
property for the economy and iTar effort of the occupant.
The general Article on reqai'sitions^ Article ^2, permits requi
sitions'only for the needs of the army of occupationj in proportion to
otherwise
the resources of tho countrj'"^ and it is not/pormissible -jithin the
meaning of the Article for the occupant to utilize the properties of
the occupied territories in furthorance of military operations against
the occupied country or its allios.
The tald.ng of property nhich may appear to be correct as a matter
of form constitutes nothing other than a requisition, iThen the elements
of force, threat, compulsion, or duress are present in the transfer.
It is clear that such taking must be "".'oighed according to the limitations
of Article $2y and payment of full value or consideration does not
legalize seizure or transfer 'ehich is not pormissiblo in tho first
instance.
Thus, in the Krupp Case, T7hero the Krupp enterprise sexzcd and
sought to compel the sale of a Fronch-oimed machine, then being used by
Krupp in furtherance of Gorman irar prediction, the TriJ^unal found a
Clime against property, in violation of Articles $2 and li6. In the
Flick case, vhore the defendant took over and oporated, with the intent
to permanently retain, properties rhich had been seized by the Roich,^
originally under a justified need to preserve public order and safety,
the Tribunal hold Friedrich Flick guilty of vrar crimes. 'Then the I. G.
Farbenindustiio organized a company, Francolor, to take over the assets
of the individual enterprises composing the French chemical industiy and
ivhen they forced the French reprosontativos to make "an adjustment to
the nor; conditions", the Tribunal adjudged several defendants partici
pating in the nerotiatlons or infoimod thereof to be guilty of a com
pleted spoliation transaction.
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(^) Public Froporty
The principal provisions of the Hague Regulations dealing spccifi-
cpl-ly TTith piblic property are Articles 5^3 ^5^. Article ^3 entitles
the occupant to seize 'such goods as "cash" and "realizable securities"
belonging to the enemy state, and also all movable public property rrhich
may bo used for military operations. Article entitles the occupying
state to administer "public buildings, real estate^ forests, and <agri~
cultural estates belonging to the hostile St<ato, and sitiated in the
occupied country." The occup3'"inp: authorities must safeguard the capital,
of these properties and administer them in accordance rd-th the rules of
usufruct.
Those articles of the Hague Regulations do not specifically refer
to industrial property ov/ned by the State or to mines and mineral re
serves publicly oimed. No single one 'of the Hague Regulations is
exactly in point. Bit it seems clear that the restrictions to be
applied r/ith respect to the administration and use of such industrial
property are not less than the restrictions applicable to public buildings,
forests and agricultural lands belonging to the occuoied State.
In ar^ event, the use of public properties must be limited to the
needs of the occupation and in proportion to the rc3Sources of the country.
This follou's from the judgment of the International Military Tribunal.
In viev; of the importance of public Industrial property to the economy
of a coiintry, the application of the general standard to such property
is supported by more impelling considerations than its application to
other State-owned property, and is supported by considerations equally
as persuasive as in the case of private property. This is merely to say
that the economic utility of a state-oY/ned steel mill is more like that
of a private-cY'med steel mill than of a state-oY/ned park, 'le submit that
the Hague Convention, in its fund.mental principles, v/as not designed
to favor a j^rticular system of property, but to limit the use of the
occupied territories to the requirements of occupation itself.
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If tho southeastern section of the United States^ containing the
public corporation Tennessee Valley Authority^ T;ere to be occupied by
enemy forces, rhile the occupant could seize and operate the plants and,
enterprises of TVA, it cannot be seriously argued that the occupant r/ould
be entitled to shut off all electric poiTer to rural and municipal areas
and to convert the TVA into a por;er plant for muriitions or
related industries to be utilized in pressing the u-ar against,
the remainder of the United States or its Allies.
f'e think that it is clear from, the judgment of the International
iiilitary Tribunal that T/ar crimes and crimes against humarAty may exist
vfhere public property is exploited beyond the general limitations of
the lar;s and customs of -Tar* As Charles Cheney Hyde has put it, in
disaissing Article
"In T.'hatever it does, the occupant should be regarded as the
' temporary controller rather than as tho sovereign of, or the
successor to the sovereign of tho area concerned . • •
"As such controller, it is highly unreasorxable that, tho
occupant should endeavc^ to enrich itself at the ejqjense of
the area concerned." i'
Only this difference is recognizable in tho rights of the occupant
Tfhen dealing T/ith public property as compared to private property —
✓ -
that the occupant may exercise and, indeed, is probablj'- compelled by
the reqiiremGnts of public order and, safety to exercise a consGrvato]:^
administration of public properties, r/hereas special justification is
required for seizing and managing private property altogether.
The question of public property in Case 11 arises almost entirely
out of the conduct of the defendants in exploiting Russian industries
and resouroGS. Abundant evidence TJhich has been introduced in this
case has demonstrated that the basic decrees and rogvilations pursuant
to which the German authorities seized amd operated Russian properties
called for the unrestricted exploitation of such properties for Geman
war production. This objective was one of the underlying reasons for
the very invasion of Russia, Tho German decrees emphasized that the
1/ Hyde, International Law, 2d ISdition, Boston, 19U5) Vol. I"'T, para, 696A,
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occupying authoritios vrauldj on principle, disregard the needs of the
inhabitants and the limits of the resources of the country, Furthormore^
thcsG sajnc diroctivcs emphasized the title of the Reich to all public
industrial property in Russia and the completo potvcr of disposition as
noil as use of such property. All of this nas cloarly understood, and
oven promulgated by the defendants themselves in some cases. The
"monopoly companies" or "sponsor firms" r.iiich took over Russian ontcr-
piisos recognized, in the trust agreement itself, that they ^.-.'oro acting
for the Reich as "oT/ner"> It seems perfectly clear that an intention to
permanently acquire ivas present and that the intention y/as coraplotoly
inconsistent r/ith the obligation of the occupying pctver, or its agents,
to aQminister public property only as a usufiuctuary vithin the general
limitations governing belligerent occi:?>ation,
(6) Responsibility
Under Paragraph 2 of Article II of Control Council Lav: No. 10, to
establish the responsibility of a defendant for acts of spoliation, it
is not riocessary to, prove that he personally conceived and c'cocutod an
entire program or transaction. Guilt is established if it is shoivn, for
exojuple, tint the defendant -ivas coniiectod nith plans and enterprises in
volving the commission of crimes covered by Couuc Six, cr was a member
of an:^ organization or group coniioctod ulth the commission of such
crime. Hov;evor, in almost all instances those defendants have been in
dicted for their ov.ai personal activities — for the decrees and orders
they issued, for the policies thoy set, for the advice they offorod, for
the "contracts" they signed, for the "negotiations^" thoy conducted, for
the letters thoy TJrote, and for the monies they appropriated —— in fur
therance of spoliation transactions and programs,
Tlie principle of individual responsibility for intemationcal crimes
is fiml^'' established. And the judgments in the Flick, Farbcn, and
Krupp cases leave no doubt that there is no special immunity for so-
call;:d private businessmen.
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Furthermore, it is no defense that the acts of the individual defen
dant Trore cciinittcd vjithin the framcTJork of govornmental plans. In s-ome
cases that is the gist of the crime, Tfhere the program of the Nazi State
and Party r/as obviously criminal. As the Krupp Tribunal observed:
"The defendants cannot as a legal proposition successfully
contend that, since the acts of spoliation of '.'rhich they arc
charged Tjore authorized and actively supported by certain
German governmental and military agencies or persons, ^ney
escape liability for such acts. It is a general princxple
of criminal lav; that encouragemcmt and support received from
T.'rongdocrs is not excusable." i/
ITor are these defendants entitled to argue that ignorance of the
specific requirements of international Iv.ti relieves them of ciiminal
responsibility. It is nocossary only to establish that the defendant
intondod r/hat his conduct accomplished; he need not have boon a'naro
that his acts constituted crimes as a conclision of fact and laiv. Again,
as the Krupp Tribunal stated:
, , T.'hcn a person acting v/ithout ^nstification or excrase
commits an act prohibited as a crime, his intention to
commit the act constitutes the criminal intent."2/
It has boon suggested that persons rdio participated as brokers or
agents in the transfers of spoliated property arc immune from an assess^*
ment of guilt. But it seems clear that a thief does not gain immunity
for his actions mer-cly because he only received a commission for his
efforts instead of tho proceeds of the entire theft. Conversely, re
ceipt of the procoods ;7ithout participation in the theft is also not
innocent. Knovrlodgc of the character of th« original
Z7f±oto7t lasts to hold defendants responsible for their/partidipation.
The category of criminals knoxm as accossorios after the fac^ is recog
nized in probably every criminal code in the T/orld.
1/ Opinion and Judgment, Case 10, p. 2^,
^ Opinion and Judgment., C.ase 10, p. 6?»
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As Tribanal II in Case U (the Pohl Case) stated:
"The fact that Pohl hjjnself did not actually transport the
stolen goods to the Reich'or did not himself remove the
teeth of the dead inmates, docs"not exculpate him. This
"iras a "broad criminal program . • • and Pohl's part nas to
conserve and account for the loot. Having knoT/ledge o^f thd
illegal purposes of the action , « . his active participa
tion oven in the after-phases of the Action makes him par-
ticops criminis in the v;hole affair." 1/
The sane principle has been applied in' the Flick., Farbon and Krupp
oases, vhcrc defendants received and managed illegally acquired properties,
(7) Military necessity
* Several counsel for the defense have argued that since it is per
mitted to destroy private property in the course of nar operations, it
must be legal to utilize property in occupied territories as needed in
" the ivaging of var. Somctimos the same doctrine is phrased in terras of
the roquirenionts of "total i~ar" vrhich, it is alleged, nas a brutal in-
s vention of Anglo-Saxon countries. Tliat is to say, the broad character
of T.'?r in modern times requires that all restrictions of l^^a/ bo ..tivcd
at the convenienco of the belligerent.
It is almost Gno"gh, by rjay of reply, to sira "!ly state the conten-
^ tions, and v;e do not think that t/g are distorting the essential argument
at all. But it may be pointad cut that manj'- of the programs and trans
actions involved in Case 11 hardly classify as military neccssitios
•if
under even the most extreme conception of that term. This may be said
for most of the ai^/anisation and interlacing businoss carried out by
Rascho, and also, generally, for the programs diroctod towards permanent
, Gennan domination of the European economy after the successful conclusion
of the r,*ar,
^Tnon those arguments of military necessity were made before tic
International liilitriry Tribunal, as before every other Tribunal convened
in IKirnberg, the International Military T^ibimal not only flatly rejected
them, but quito properly pointed out, that the crimes themselves arose
1/ Judgment, Caso U, Tr, p. 8093.
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out of the Nozi conception that 'Hho moral ideas underljd.ng tho convcn-
. • 1/'
tions T:hich seok to make 7;ar moro humane" vrcrc no longer valid#
A variation in the argument states that atcnic bombs are used today
and unrestricted sutmarine v/arfare is no longer forbiddonj therefore it
follcn-rs that the lav:s of belligerent occupation no longer exist. As. the
Farbon Tribunal pointed out, if uncertaintios and changes have developed
in the le.v;s r/hich govern phases of ivaging v;ar, this docs not force the
"conclusion that the provisions of the Hague Regulations, protecting
y
rights of public and private property, my bo ignored." The very
purpose of the Hague Convention v;as to set standards regulating bolli-
geront occupation. To accept the contentions of the defense would
leave us vdth no law at all.
In tlia Krupp Case, the defense of military necessity in modern
total mr v/as briefly dismissed mth the obsermtion that the conditions
and nooossitios of a war cannot possibly oxcuse violations of the laws
of ivar, since the laws of war are designed orecisely for the conditions
y
and nccossitios of war,
(8) Dpjnagos Standard
The argument has been advanced that since certain properties, per
haps vnrongfullj'' seized, were returned to their true ov/ners at the end
of the war, no loss was really suffered and no crime should be found.
Another form of this argument states that where substantial value TTas
given for seized properties, no crime can be found in law. In this
connection dofonse counsel have introduced evidence to shoiv that the
properties v;ore actually improved, as an excuse for illegal acti\dtios.
In sane cases where the removal of machinery and equipment is charged,
GvldoncQ has been offered purporting to show thht other nachinoiy and
invostnonts ivoro jmt into thfc plant#
In the view of the Prosecution, all of these contentions are beside
the point. If the taking or the operation of plants was illegal, the
i/ Trial of lAa.jor 'Tar Criminals. Vol. I, p. 227,
Opinion and Judgment, Case 6.,, p., 8l,
2/ Opinion and Judgment, Case 10, p, 26,,
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question of damag }s is completely irrclovanti ^^Damages^ is a concoot
vfhich is pertinent to civil actions, and to civil actions only, Tims,,
nhoro Cellini steals a bar of gold and fashions an elegant salt shaker
from the gold, the orner,. having regained the gold as improved by
Cellini's artistry, might have considerable difficulty in recovering
damages. But in a criminal case Cellini rjould have no argument "Whatso
ever.
Squally, r.'hero machinery a-as removed from seized plants, r/hothcr
public or private plants, the defendants responsible cannot bo hoard
to say that they had added to the value of the plant othcrrri-sc. For,
"whether dealing T'ith public or private propert"'", at most the defendants
could have only the right of an administrator or usufructuaiy. This
does not give the authority to dispose of the capital stock and equip
ment of the enterprise in any fashion inconsistent "with that limited
right.
The decided cases repudiate this suggested relative value test for
the commission of a crime. In the ivords of the Roechling decisionj '
, . it is equally vain that Hermann Roechling maintains
tlie.t' he had invested large suns in these plants, v/hilc in
fact, even ad-nitting that this should bo the case, it would
in no way modify the responsibility of the dcfcnd.ant, since ^
oxocnscs incurred for an object obtained by moans of a crinina.1
act or offense do not eliminate the fraudulent character of
such a possession," Y/
Paronthotically, wo may note that the affima.tivo proof offered oy
the Dofonso to establish this "justification" has gonorally consisted
of an affidavit by friends or associates of the defendant, asserting that
value was ;7ut into plants over-all. Even whore eaicrote figures aro
introducod, they are moaningloss unless weighed with regard to changing
price levels and economic values and with roga.rd to the availability
of the individual kind of machine or other oquijinont.
Moreover, wo submit as a factual matter that the very fact, if es
tablished, that the defendant added to the capital of tho seized plants
"y Chpinion aiK^. Judgment, Roechling Case, p, 11,
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tends very strongly to establish (l) that he planned to pcrnanently
acquire the cnterprisOj in derogation of the rights of the true oi7nor_,
and (2) that he r/as utilizing the plants for Tvar purposes, beyond the
needs of the army of occupation. It is difficult, in the light of all
V
the evidence, to visualize Plciger putting funds or equipment into
Polish iron mines in order to enrich the Polish ormor, or in ordor to
Imorovc Gconomic conditions for the Polish civilian population.
-S4-
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VCOUNT VII, V/AFi C?aL:ES aND CRIMES AGAINST
HUIvIANITY, SLAVE LABOR-
The charges under Count VII involve the crininaJ.
conduct which flows from involuntary servitude imiDOsed
on a broad scale end from the use of prisoners of war
beyond the clear limits imposed by international con
ventions. Similar charges are more common to the war
crimes trials in Nurnberg than any other type of offense -
and numerous decisions have discussed the applicable law
and recounted the bestiality of the widespread crime
generally abbreviated merely as "slave labor".
Germany's first offense in this field comic in the
first T^orld 17ar when Germany deported Belgians to Germany,
an e.ct which called forth such an outcry and such general
indignation from the civilized world that the then rulers
1/
of Germany withdrew from their criminal conduct. If
any substantial number of leading persons in Germany's
Third Reich had learned a proper lesson from Germany's
first international crime in this field, countless
thousands of human beings.would still be living and we
would be spared the unfortunate necessity of calling
Germany's leaders to account by vrar crimes trials. The
law regonding deportation, enslovcment, the illtreatment
of foreign labor and concentration camp inmates, the ill-
treatment of prisoners of war and related matters needs
no empha.sis by general recapitulation here. Me have cnarged
tha.t the offenses connected with slave labor run from the
period March 1938 through May 1945. Our view of the in
ternational law applicable to the occupation of Austria
1/ See Volume II, Oppenh'eira,~Int"erna"tlonal Law, 3rd Edition,
p.20; Vol.VI, Hachworth, Digest of International Lav;,p.399.
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and. Czechoslovakia has "been summarized earlier in ovr
discussion of the 1837 applicable to plunder and spolia
tion, If the criminal conduct remanding the enslavement
of persons before 1 September 1939 is not found by the
Tribunal to be war crimes, then this criminal conduct
still falls within the ca.tegory of crimes against humanity
Some of the defendants charged under Count VII
participated directly in ordering and directing criminal
acts involving the entire slave labor program. Others
engaged in the execution and application of the slave
lalDor program to particular areas and particular in
dustries. At the least, each of the defendants was en
accessory to, took a consenting part in, was connected
with plans and enterprises involving, or was a member of
an organization or group connected V7ith the criminal
slave labor program. In the individual briefs we sot
forth the responsibilities which each of the indivual
defendants incurred in this field. The fact that indi
vidual defendants may not. have known of some particular
detail in the carrying out of a program which they had
initiated, supported or approved, is unimportant. No
person could know all the detailed ramifications of the
execution of all'adopted progrms. But where, as in the
activities here involved, the execution of the spe
programs extended over a relatively long period of e,
those who are responsible for initiating,
carrying them out cannot claim th£it they did not know and
are not responsible for what ws.s happening during their
execution.
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comT VIII
i-CEMBERSKIP IIT CSIMIIIAL ORGANIZM?IO]:TS
The Indictment charges various defendants witn membership in or
ganizations declared to be criminal by the B'iT, e.g., the SS, the SD,
and the Leadership Corps.
' As to the SS, it has been contended en behalf of all the defendants
charged, except Berger and Sohellenberg, as a matter of law, that
membership in a criminal organization does not attach to so—called
honorary SS leaders. Such argument, in addition to the legal concept
of criminal membership in the SS, specifically as it has been interpreted
by the HiT,, by other Military Tribunals, and particularly in the deci
sions of the Denazification Courts throughout G-ermany, is treated at
length In the prosecution*s briefs entitled "Circle of Friends," and
"Honorary Membership in the SS." The factual basis for the charges
contained in Count VIII of the I^^dictment - the voluntary character of
defendants' membership in the SS and their Imowledge of SS activities -
f is left to the individual briefs on defendants.
The B£T does not in any imy exempt the so-called honorary SS
leaders from the categories of criminal membership in the SS. Such
membership in the SS is based on two main elements:
(a) to be officially accepted as a member in the SS and to reiiiaia
therein until a time later than 1 September 1949, while the
act cf joining must not be due to compulsion by the State;
(b) knowledge of the criminal activities in which the So was
engaged.
All of the 14 defendants charged with membership in the SS joined
voluntarily, since all enlistments into the SS were voluntary until 1940.
(BIT, Vol. I, p. 270.) These defendants possess all the requirements ef
guilt set forth in the BIT Judgment (Vol I, p,. 273).. The evidence ad
duced in support of the other charges of the Indictment overwhelmingly
establish© s knowledge of and participation in the criiidnal activities
of the SS»
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Only the defendant Schellenberg is charged with membership in the
SD. The SD and the Gestapo were component parts of the HShA, ene of the
twelTe main departments of the SS. In dealing with the SD,the IIvlT
included members of Amts HI, VI, and VII, of the RSEl and all other
members of the SD, including all local representatives and agents,
honorary or ctherwise, whether they vrere technicallj^ members of the SS
or not, to be criminally responsible. (L T, p. 267) Schellenberg was
Ciiief of Amt VI. His guilt is established.
In the case of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, criminal
membership was declared to depend upon the position or ranlc held by the
accused. Cu.:!, pp. 2S1-2S2.) The defendants so charged were members
of the Leadership Corps in categories declared to be criminal by the Dil.
Darre and Dietrich were Eaichsleiters; Bohle was a Gauleiterj and.
Keppler was a Hauptamtsleiter. These rants were included in the posi
tions enumerated by the EIT as bearing criminal responsibility. The
further requisite of guilt is to hare become or remained a member of the
organization with knov/ledge that it was being used for the commission of
criminal acts, or to have been personally implicated as a member of the
organization in the comrHssion of such crimes. As the HH said (p. 232).
"...The basis of this finding is the participation of
the organization in ii/ar Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
connected with "che war; the group declared criminal
cannot include, therefore, persons •vdio had ceased to
hold the positions enumerated in the preceding paragraph
prior to 1 September 1939."
These defendants possess all the requirements of guilt set forth
in the IMT.
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CREPIBILITY OF DEFEMmifTS AND mTNESSSS
In the Opening St?itement of this case^ the Prosecution asserted^'
"The cancer of the Third Reich, spreading crime throughout the political
organism .. . , was the suppression of truth. And it is the supernal
mendacity of these defendants which is most revolting,"
If only the testimony of the defendants in this courtroom v/ere to
I
^ be considered as a basis for that strong charge, we would not v.dthdraw
a letter of it. It has been most apparent throughout the trial that
the defendants have not changed character since This Ti'ibunal
has listened to lies, inventions, contradictions and evasions which
would tax the patience of the most credulous, i.ljnost every document of
the hundreds introduced into evidence during cross-examination of the
defendants marks the spot where a lie v^as exposed.
This characteristic of the testimony of the defendants became so
systematic that fabrications which were- purely superfluous were offered.
For e::ample, the defendant Kehrl asserted fimly that he was never av/are
of econoraic persecution of Jews prior to 1936. Bi^t Kehrl admitted that
he joined the Nazi Party early, that he had read "Mein Kampf", that he
read the Party journals, and that he lived in the heart of Germany,
Furthermore, he was the economic advisor to the Gau Brandenburg until
193^) £'-no the Gau offices were charged vrith insuring the execution of
the "aryanizatlon" program, Herr Kehrl is not and y/as not then an
uncomprehending idiot.
Similarly, Puhl, self-proclaimed hero of the resistance, thought
that^the only defect of the SS was that it was a military organization,
Fhhl, so he says today, also thought that all inmates of concentration
camps were Iiabitual criminals. But elsewhere he has contended that he
vjas diligent in aiding prospective concentration camp inmates, who were
not at all habitual criminals.
Not/, these are the merest examples of gratuitous "explanations" of
¥ «
conduct r .e do not mean to snggegt, in any way, that the large part
I 11 ifciitf i"i %if -|TftlT[>il" f
of the fabrications presented here iTere irrelevanti Most pertinent
to the defense of "insignificance" put forward on behalf of Laminers 7;as
Lanimers* or/n testimony to the effect that he was a chief clerk and
notary public of Hitler. However, it appears in the record that
Lammors was Chief of the Reichschancellory, with the highest salarj' of
all Geirnan public officials, and that upon the occasion of his sixty-
fifth birthday he had received the scarcely trifling bonus of six hun
dred thousand marks from Hitler. To paraphrase the remarks of a well-
kncn-/n American figures "Some clerkl Some notary public I "
It v;?.s also highly relevant in Hitter *s case to deny all knowledge
of the Jewish extertninations, as Hitter did. But his own rmtness,
Mackeben, stated in cross-examination (at page 11738 of the Transcript)
that he had had long discussions vri.th Hitter on that very subject.
Among the other phenomena which appear in the accounts of the de-
dendants themselves are exposures of total amorality. Thus, Pleiger,
recounting his exploits in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lorraine,
and Russia, constantly emphasized that ths enterprises seized and
operated him were very badly managed by their true oT^ers.- To Pleiger,
German ef:'iciency — that is, his or/n efficiency — was a sufficient
reason for taking the properties of other persons. Of course, it is
quite clear that he nevertheless would have taken and did take over pro
perties which were •well--iiianaged and in excellent condition, such as the
Polish plant Stalowa ""liTola, or the Czech '.TitJcovdtz plants which General
Kcntel described as the "most modern rolling mill in the world."
Among other attitudes blandly put forth by Pleiger, and shared,
in liiGir <j:n testimony, by other defendants, were attitudes such as these.
If German totalitarianism may force the labor of Germans, what can pos
sibly be -wrong v,'ith enslaving the populations of other states. Or, if
an important and efficient man has several tens of thousands of persons
✓
v/orking under him, how can he reasonably be expected to bother about
the fact that some hundreds or thousands are concentration camp i?imates?
As Pleigor stated in reply to the question of -why the Hermann Cos ring
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Werke entered into joint r^eratlona with the SS, operations eo^loying
bimdreds of concentratim cainp la"borei*gi
"A, If my tjoss Goering said, *Settle the matter so that
Himmler is satisfied* then I carried out that order.
With the "best will in the world, you could not have a
show-dovm v;ith the two most powerful men in the Reich;
the issue v;as much too small. . ,
Q. Let me ask you this; was the eij5)loyment of several
hundred concentration carp inmates a small matter to you?
A, When the matter was under discussion it was a question
of a plant ecploying two or three hundred persons.
Airing the war every woman and every young gi^l v/orked,
I It was not my point of view that prisoners should not
\ work. Let me state that e^^licitly, ,
(tr.p. 15501)
We could multiply such exanples several times for Pleiger and then
> multiply aga-in "by thp number of defendants in the dock. It v/ould take
too long. We only mention these matters because the principal evidence
offered in defense ha,s been given by the defendants themselves, and
the quality of this testimony is one measure of the defense,
* B 'y way of striking contrast, we recall the words of the defen
dant Bohle, stated in open court on 23 July 1948 (tr.p. 13531):
I think it should be the solemn pledge and foremost duty
' of every German who held a leading position during theivational Socialist regime, to do all in his -power .to remove
from^ the name of Germany the blot v^hich the deeds of
criminal brains have cast upon it^ We know that a low
estimate of human life and carelessness to human misery is
not and never has been a trait of the German character, and
f for that very reason I thinlc that we should frajikly admit
i the atrocities that have been committed and that have defiled
« the German name in the world, I do not think that we should
atterpt to vindicate ouv own national honor solely by referring
to crimes and misdeeds committed by others, some of which
are undoubtedly on a par vrith what Rational Socialism i'S
" accused of. I think we should be too proud for that,
I think it is my firm conviction that the world v/ill regain
its belief in our national honesty, only if we ourselves are
honest and straightforward in our confessions and thereafter
also in our will to majre amends, I think we leading men have
this res-:^onsibillty, not only to the victims of these crimes
but Just as riiUch to the German people, as such, vfho, with or
^ without our participation, were misled and misguided and ore
today, withou-t any fault of their oij-m, outlawed in the world,
hat is what I understand by responsibility beyond that of
my own v/ork."
I Bohle* s view in this respect has been neither shared nor appreciated
by his CO—dejfendants, as the proceedings have made clear.
The "Prosecution does not begrudge the offer of evidence by any
person vho is informed about the facts, but we would like to point out
aspe<its of wha.t has developed into a mutual insurance society to play
(l-^wn the responsibility of numerous individuals, both in Rornberg and
in the denazification courts. This condition has come about in the
reciprocal exchange of affidavits and testimony.
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For o::^.mplGj tho affiant von Nostitz gave sovcn affidavits for
'iGizsaGcker, one for ^Toerraann, and four for other defendants. In
exchange, he received one affidavit from ^roizsaecker and one from another
defense aifiant for his personal use in denazification proceedings. The
affiant a former servant of the Foreign Office, gave six affida
vits for V/eizsaecker and received in exchange one affidavit frcm
Ueizsaccker and at least four more from other Weizsaecker affiants.
The defense affiant Sonnenleitor gave four affidavits for ¥cissaecker
and received one fran Ueizsaecker, Sonnenloiter gave four affidavits
for Stoengracht and received one affidavit in exchange from Gteengracht.
He gave three for Hitter an-- received one from Hitter, And generally
he gave betrreen one and tr;o doz^^n, as he admitted, to other defense wit
nesses and received a number in exchange.
As Stoengracht* s affiant, Mirbach, has explained, he frit, that siioa
IcLnd of hole yns a d:.Lty amcng former Foreign Office colleagues.
It Ixas been apparent throughout tho trial that most of the witnesses
brought by the defense felt or wore persuaded that they were mombcrs of
a "com:-mnity of interest" to which tho defonr^ants also belonged. This
was not only true for tho Foreign Office. To illustrate, Kehrl brought
0'
as principa,! i.itnesses or affiants, his Economic Ministry assistant,
Hoostor, and his aides in the Ostfascr enterprises. Rascho offered a •
good part of the poraonnol of the Ircsdner Rank, particularly persons
such C.S Ansmann and Hinn, who had been implicated directly in spoliation
activities. Such persons wcro bound to make self-serving statements,
and they did so in total disregard of tho truth. Similarly, the defen
dants Iiavc displayed a geriBrcus spirit of cooperation. Stuckart, now
as a legal expert, has written a memorandum on behalf of Koemor, Pleiger,
RaSGhe,.and Kehrl, wherein he assures tho Tiibunal that the occupation
of Eohemia-Moravia was entirely justified in international law and recom
mends that the Tribunal dismiss charges based upon conduct in that area-.
In the some way, the services of Puhl, as a financial export, have been
cem'.Tondoercd bv several of tho othor dofendants.
ro~
rFabrications, lies, inventi'^ns, contradictions and '^er^slana-
tions" were rampant in the Commission hearings. One illustration
may demonstrate the value of statements of defense affitants,
Altenhnn^, of the Foreign Office, gave five affidavits for
Weizsaecker, one for Steengracht, one for Keppler, one for Veesen*-
mayer, and one for Bohle, all listing his correct present address.
On cross-examination in Commission, he was asked whether he had
testified concerning his personal involvement in Jevash persecutions
during his denazification trial. He naturally ansv/ered in the
affirmative. But the denazification files used on cross-examination
show that the court was not at all aware of Altenbiurg's anti-Jewish
activities, "because this iidtness had used another address for the
denazification proceedings in order to prevent the discovery of
damning evidence,
Ve will not even discuss here the value of character evidence
which has been offered, consisting of personality estimates of the
defendants "by such reputable citizens as Oswald Pohl, Otto Ohl'^ndorf,
and Leo Tolk of the S3 and SD, and of other distinguished gentlemen
such as Otto Abetz, Werner Best, Erhard Liilch and Franz 3chlegel—
berger, who were high in the Hazi hierarchy.
One other peculiarity of the testimony heard here deserves
^ecial mention. It is not strange that the defendants could not
recall activities charged against them v;hen such activities occurred
six or eight or ten years ago. However, It is unusuol that they
invariably v/ere able to remember the exact numbers and names of
persecutees v^hom they aided and even the precise devices by which
aid was given. r,;ost astounding is the miracle which took place when
the defendants had been given documents to refresh recollection
concerning criminal transactions. ITot only were they instontly
able to recall v;here the secretary erred at crucial points in the
transcription, but, wherever necess^rry, they were readily able to
e:5)lain how the printed word meant its exact contrary. In this
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fashion, Rasche, confronted with the Dresdner Bank Vorstand 2-iinutes
of 2 October 1941 (Exhibit 3222), which obst-:rved that a "non—
gaar?jiteed'^ credit of twenty millions had been granted to Ostfaser,
stated that the mmnutes were "not quite correct . ♦ . the Reich
was liable." (tr.p. 17708), presented thereafter by his ovm
counsel \d.th the record of a conference between Dresdner representa
tives and Reich authorities, where the Reich officials fla.tly
rejected any liability (Exhibit 3229), he observed that '^he legal
opinion stressed is erroneous, . (tr.p. 1771C). In the sme way,
Eehrl, having denied "competence" in banking affairs in the
'trotestorate", contended that a document stating that he would
hp.ve a "decisive voice"ia-guch affairs should more accurately be
translated as stating that he would have a "decisive pert".
. . put it the other way around and I dill wrnt to
ask you what you think it means?
A, It me?nt th^t I was not the decisive factor — that
I was one of several decisive factors, 3?ha.t is
what the document says, .
(tr.p. 16916)
To sum up this section on the reliability of defense testim'^ny
and evidence, we vriLll repeat what we consider, in a most chrritr'ole
view, to have been the attitude typical of the defendants and their
witnesses when they were speaking under oath, Koorner candidly
stated (tr.p. 14717):
"I was a witness on behalf of Goering and I had to take
certain considerations into account in behalf of my
old chief. I didn't defend him, but I gave certain
statements which I believed were c^rpable of exonerr.ting
him so far as I was able to exonerate him. That is the
way we have to look at these things. . . I would never
have incriminated a man who was still alive at the time."
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SUPERICR CRDia^.S, TH3 DSFEITSE OF ALLEGED ^^
DURESS, AND TIE iiTTIGATIGN OF PUNISHIWT ''^ ,{v
EP^ 2?^^^ —_
Control Council Lavr Ho.10, like the London Charter, provides
that a superior order does not free an accused from individual
responsibility for crime, but that a superior order "may be
considered in mitigation". The record before you contains a
reservoir of proof on the ramifications of individual responsibility
for crime yrliich was not present 7d.th such force or detail in the
-y
record before the International Ililitary Tribunal. Yet the conduct
alleged as criminal in the case here is identical with, runs parallel
to, or derives directly from the criminal conduct analyzed by the
International i;Iilitary Tribunal. Hence it is particularly'"
appropriate to refer this Tribunal to the classic statement of the
/• 0^ "fcJie general subject of individual criminal responsibility,
at pages 222 and 223 of Vol. I, official printed text, English
edition. This classic statement concludes "with the follovfing nrach
quoted sentence;
t "Crimes against international law are committed
by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes
can the provisions of in"fcernational lav; be
enforced."
Particularly in vra.r crimes cases, the law on superior orders cannot
properly be separated veiy far from a consideration of the defense
of duress or coercion - and ordinarily the Judgriients have discussed
• I
" ' these "bvo questions as closely related mat"bers.
In Case No.Ill before Tribunal Ho.Ill, the so-called Justice
g Case, the Tribunal found no circumstances or reasons which warranted
any variation in or reformulation of the law on this point as defined
by "the IMT. In its Judgment at pages 10759 IO76O of the trans
cript, Tribunal No. Ill quoted the same provisions from the EvIT
Judgment \^ich we have Just read. The Tribunal in that case T;as
also faced with a special type of defense claim to immunity, namely^
that "Judges are entitled to the benefit of the Anglo-Aifierlcan
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doctrine of judicial immunity". In rejecting this particular
brand of alleged iimmmity. Tribunal No. Ill declared the follo™g
at page 10703 of the transcript:
"In vievT of the conclusive proof of the sinister
influences which vrere in constant interplay between
Hitler, his Ministers, the Ministry of Justice, the
party, the Gestapo, and the courts, we see no merit in
the siiggestion that Nazi judges are entitled to the
benefit of the Anglo-American doctrine of judicial
imiiiunity. The doctrine that judges are not personally
V liable for their judicial actions is based on the
concept of an independent judiciary administering
impartial justice. Furthermore, it has never prevented
the prosecution of a judge for malfeasance in office.
the evidence cited supra does not demonstrate the
utter destruction of judicial independence and
impartiality, then vre 'never Tn?it nor no man ever
proved'. The function of the Nezi courts vras judicial
only in a limited sense. They more closely'- resembled
administrative tribunals acting under directives from
j, above in a quasi-judicial manner."
1
It 1/ill be difficult, it seems to us, for the defense to conjure
up ar^ claims of imraunity from criminal responsibility in this case
of anj'" greater substance than the ill—founded claim of "judicial
immunity" which v/as made in Case No.III.
In Case No.XII, in the judgment recently rendered by Tribunal
No.V, the Tribunal declared that the recognition of the contention
of superior orders as a defense would be the recognition of
absurdit3'-. After stating that paragraphs U(a) and (b) of article H
of Control Council Law No,10 were "clear and definite" on the
subject of superior orders. Tribunal No.V vrent on to say:
defendants in this case held official positions
in the armed forces of the Third Reich. Hitler from 1936
on 'rias Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and yrs-s the
Supreme Civil and Military authority in the Third Reich,
whose personal decrees had the force and effect of law.
Under such circumstances to recognize as a defense to tl^c
crimes set forth in Control Council Law No.10 that a
defendajit acted pursuant to the order of his government
or of a superior would be in practical effect to say that
all the guilt charged in the Indictment the guilt of
Hitler alone because he alone possessed the law-making
pcfv7Gr of the state and the supremo authority to issue
civil and military directives. To recognize such a
contention T/ould bo to recognize an absurdity.
"It is not necessary to support the provision of
Control Council Law No.10, Art.II, Sees. [i.(a) and (b),
by reason, for we arc bound by it as one of the basic
authorities under vrhich we function as a Judicial Tribunal,
Reason is not lacking."
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<This Tribimal furiiiier stated:
"International Comnion La^j" must bo superior to and^
I'Vhere it conflicts take precodoncG over National
Law or directives issued by any national governmental
authorit;*r, a directive to violate International Criminal
Comraon Law is therefore void and can afford no
protection to one who violates such 3aw in reliance on
such a directive.
"The purpose and effect of all lavr^ national or
internationalj is to restrict or channelize the action
of the citizen or subject. International law has for
its purpose and effect the restricting and channelizing
of the action of nations. Since nations are corporate
entities^ a composite of a multitude of huiiian beings,
and since a nation can plan and act only through its
agents and representatives, there can be no effective
restriction or channelizing of national action except
through control of the agents and representatives of
the nation, v/ho form its policies and carry them out
in action.
"The State being but an inanimate corporate entity
or concept, it cannot as such make plans, determine
policies, exercise judgment, experience fear or be re-^
strained or deterred from action except through its ani
mate agents and representatives. It v-rould be an utter
disregard of reality and but legal shadov.'-boxing to say
that only the State, the inanimate entity, can have guilt,
and tliat no guilt can be attributed to its animate agents
who devise and execute its policies. Nor can it be per
mitted oven in a dictatorship that the dictator, absolute
though he may be, shall bo the scapegoat on whom the sins
of all his governmental and military subordinates are
•wished; and "that, when he is driven into a bunker and
presumably destroyed, all the sins and guilt of his su^
ordinates sliall bo considered to have been destroyed "with
him,
"The defendants in this case v/ho received obviously
crim^al orders wore placed in a difficult position but
servile compliance with orders clearly criiiiinal for fear
of some disadvantage or punishment not immediately
threatened cannot be rocogniaed as a defense. To es
tablish the defense of coercion or necessity in the face
of danger there must be a sho^-mng of circums"tances such
that a reasonable man would apprehend that ho ivas in
such oimmnGnt physical peril as to deprive him of free
dom to choose the right and refrain from the "wrong. No
such situation has been shown in this case."
Thus the Tribunal connected up the vrhole problem of superior orders
to a discussion of the rGquirononts for establishing "the dcfonse
of coercion or nocosslt '^^ ". Not/, if there was no "imraincnt physical
F^rilu to the military commanders v/hich established ary "defense
of coercion or necossity in tho face of danger", it is difficult
to imagine v/hat grounds the defendan-bs in the dock here can assert
T/hich puts them in a better position.
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^ private industry of large numbers of slave laborers. Although wo
lii all of the cases tried in Nurnbcrg the defense in one way
or another has sought reliance upon superior orders and upon the
defense of necessity or coercion* Almost all the Judgments discuss
the law on these points* Perhaps in the three trials against
persons who wore principally private industrialists^, the Flick^
Farben and Krupp Cases^ the defense labored longest in attempting
to make out a defense of necessity concerning the emplcyment by
do not believe that cases involving private Industrialists are in
point hore^ we suspect that counsel for certain defendants will
cite some of the language in one or the other of those Judgments
in trying to make a defense of Justification in his arm case,
TTe believe that there arc araple quotations frcm the legal
authorities in the Flickj Farbon and Krupp Judgments. The Judgment
in the Krupp Case^ under a long section entitled "i^joccssity as a
I Defense" (Tr. p.l3382-13U01)_, includes extracts from section ^2 of
the German Criminal Code and a number of references to English
and American authorities. Wo will not repeat these citations here,
1 but we think it important to underline certain fundamental concepts
and to note certain elements wliich must be established by a
defendant undertaking the burden of establishing a defense of
necessity. Some of these concepts, vdiich arc emphasized again and
again by the authorities, are the foUoY/ings the presence of
"irresistible force"; a "present danger for life and limb"; a
"feeu* of instant death"; the absence of any opportunity for escape;
the iim'.iincnt injury'" to the accused must be shovm not to be
disproportionate to the evil ho furthers under duress.
There is no compulsion, as tlie concept is used by the
authorities, where the a3.1oged coercion was spread out through
months and oven years. There is no compulsion where the alleged
overriding conpulsion was a force to which the accused attached
his energy for ar '^" substantial period of time, oven though his
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attachment v/as abhoront to him. There is no irresistible force
vjhen the accused, having recognized evil, had any possibility
to extract himself from the corecion by some available means
even though such moans vrero difficult and highly unpleasant.
It is not enough that the injury to the accused or the possible
methods of escape from coercion involved his loss of professional
standing, his loss of property, a substantial re-ordering of his
life and habits, or even his confinement and tlie loss of
substantial personal libertj'". The historic law has recognized
no such personal injuries as a justification for committing evil
or invading the rights of others. If in war crimes cases the
defense of necessity is stretched beyond the clear and definite
limits set dcrrm by the authorities, then by judicial interpretation
superior orders in effect are made a defense - and by judicial
interpretation the provisions of t!io London Charter and Control
Council Law No.10 are in effect voided.
It is reaU_y anomalous for these defendants to clahii superior
orders or some kind of inpelling necessity or overriding duress
ivhich drove them to the acts for which they arc charged here as
criminally and individually responsible. In most instances those
defendants vrare not follov-'ing a specific comriiand as does the soldier.
Rather they 7\rere following and implementing a great complex of
criminal policy under which at one time most of Europe languished.
These defendants attached themselves to tho making or the execution
of these policies with deliberation and over a long period of time.
The service they gave tho Third Raich dui-ing the years of its
aggressive expansion required painstaking effort, proposals and
counter-proposals, and tho vrriting and consideration'of"countless
memoranda, and the ups and dovwis of political and economic
administration. In a short period of time any one of them
could have retired from the limelight of the Nazi stage merely
by shcn;njig a little loss enthusiasm or ty making himself a .
little less indispensable. Of course, such a personal reaction
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would have moant some re-ordcring of their personal lives, but
certainly those -were men of enough ability'" to ivin their daily
broad vdthout giving such forEiidablc insurance and support as
they did give to Hitler's Third Reich, TELllions of other Germans
made their way through those evil times vd.tliout sitting in the
councils of the nights'".and I'^ ic-ny Gcmans refused entanglements of
this kind of their o\"m free will,^ In a dictatorship one does not
win or hold great influence and high position by any genuine
reluctance or roticenco spread over ai^ period of tine.
If finally these vforthies before us at a given moment did
faco a demand from which they inwardly revolted because of vrhat
moral fiber still remained to them, the demand was a kind for
vfhich they had long been foreTfarned b^'' their prior kncvledgc of,
and their associations Td.th, the policies of Hitler's Third Reich.
The early persecutions of tho leaders of the Nazi opposition; the
Roclim purge; tho burning of tho sjmogugos; tho cavalier treatment
of tho independent church leaders; the violence against the
loaders of the trade unions and the cooperatives; the shake—up
of the High Command before the war; the remilitarization- of the
Rhine by unilateral action and tho violation of treaty; the
sudden sT,7eop of the Wohrmacht over Germary's sovereign neighbor -
Austria; the bold threats before 15anich; the overrunning of
Czechoslovakia T-^en the ink was scarcely dry on the Jtunich Pact;
the concentration camps in Germany v/hich certainly these defendants
had ample reason to kncfv/ would be extended once Germany had its
hands on more so-callod "inferior peoples" - all these things,
and many, many more were signposts enough. They gave warning to
many who had less intiiaato kncnvlodgo of the Nazi policy and loss
access to the inner circles than did those defendants. Germany
had become an open stage of violonco in both domestic and foreign
policy before tlie first shot was firod in Poland, These men had
more access to 'knOTrledge of the true state of affairs than did the
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mltitudc of Gormans or of foreigners. Notvrlthstanding, those
ncn dedicated years of their lives in loyal and- essential service
to significant parts of Hitler's program. They continued their
essential support, even o.s the aberrations of the Nazi program
grew in intensity and vfith geometric progression. ^Jhy did these
men go along T-vith Hitler's coterie so long? For one or more
of a number of reasons. Because they liked and admired Hitlor^s
early "successes". Because Hitler's Reich gave then a chance to
sec old scores settled by violence •'.'iiero pacific means had failed.
Because they liked the patrc'r and the prestige T^hich had eluded
most of them before they had raised their hand publicly in the
Hitler salute. Because iiioso men had Ice t the Td.ll to exorcise a
moral choice long before they felt any compelling inrrard revolt
at the violGnco of the gang of which they wore a part. Because
these men'identified their will with Hitler's cause, Ho
convincing evidence appears that these defendants shorTod any
real revulsion before they had the peculiar kind of reflection
which must have come in the air shelters as the Allied f3yors paid
back the terror of Rotterdam, the London blitz, and the Gcr^ian
c^.ve bombers in Poland. As symbolic of their true attitude during
the time when Germany was riding high, we refer to the testimony
of the defendant Ploiger, testimony perhaps given with intent of
huLior, but testimony in fact full of ironic truth. Pleiger
testified on his support of the Salzgitter iron ore project, which
ho admitted all the experts considered uneconomic. At pago 1^289
of the English transcript, Ploiger said; "I said that I would
have made a pact -vvith the devil himself in order to achieve ny alia"
Wo think Pleigcr unintentionally adverted to the true ethical and
moral attitude of most of Germany's recent leaders concerning their
respective entanglomonts with tho Nazi program. For one reason or
another theoo defendants made their pact with the devil* There
is no convincing shov/ing that these defendants felt that the .
e.pns0quehce3 of their paot wltii the devil werq, really ve,ry
hard to sv/allow, at least until near
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the end. Yfc doubt if they cc^nsidered any part of those
consequences a bitter piTL until defeat Y;as inrainont or until they
forosavf that the world's growing regard for the penal onforcon^nt
of international law assured then of an accounting iii court. But
any qualms they had were too little and too late to effect^ much
less undo, their criminal responsibility for conduct flowing from
their various related unholy alliances and entanglements. It
would be soncfwhat humorous, if it were not so tragic, to ask hcfw
many of those defendants would nc^T be charged -vTith malfeasance
and disloyalty if Germany had won the recent war. None of then
showed outwardly enough reluctance so as to be seriously suspect
even in the last hours when HinniLor and Gocbbels became more and
more the main pilots of the dying Third Reich, It is well to recall
that even Hermann Goering was interned because he vras suspected
of some disloyalty to the Fuehrer in those last days. YTe suggest
that the claims of duress hy these men will ring like a badlj'
cracked boll in the halls of history —and that these claims have
received loss credence ajiong the broad masses of Gern?.ns who kept
out of the councils of the nighty than those claims have reccivod
if attention in the courtrooms of Nurnberg.
The defendant 'Toizsacckor proposes for the serious
T
"S-J
'li
consideration of this Tribunal that ho was in bona fide resistance
to Hitler's Third Reich and to its* unspeakable Gvil.s. He sa '^S
that ho cherished in his heart the final aim of olxmin^.ting hitler
himself
and thus destroying the government in which the defendant/sorvcd
for twelve long years. If the word resistance can be stretched
to cover any of the conduct of '.Teizsacckor, it can only be
described as thje most unresisting resistance, a resistance which
took no. tangible effect, a resistance which prevented none of the
crimes cliarged, and a resistance supposedly roaintainod while tlic
^^fendant committed overt act after overt act which planned and
furthered aggression and which planned and furthered such vast
crimes as the resettlement and ultiiaate mass externine.tion of
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conntlGss defenseless victims in "ttio occupied coimtrics. The
testimony of'"^cizsaeclccr's v/itnessos and dozens of affiants on
tliis point 1T0.S cxtrsoely nebulous and padded xrLth remote hearsay
and ex post facto mshful thinking. best it revealed only
that TTeizsaccker, like many other persons in the Hitler regime^
nurtured no very cordial feelings for some of his colleagues
•in the Third Reich or for some of their techniques. The
maintena.ncG of some professional and social contacts vrith anti-
Nazis, especially during the declining years of the v.nr, does not
differentiate •'Toizsaecker from other leading officials mio tried
to take out similar last-minute life Insurance vdicn defeat vras
imminent.
The claim of •^eizsaccker is not ontirclj^ novel in Nurnbcrg,
although for sono reason it has received an abundance of attention.
In the Krupp Case the-defendant Looser offered concrete ovidenco
tThich idontifiod him 'hdth the underground to overthrcn.T Ritlcr
and the Nazi regime". Looser vfas "arrested by "ihe Gestapo in
connection mth "Uig plot of 30 July I9if-Ii." end vras scheduled for
trial - • Even real resistance was not found by the Tribuna.l to
be a justification for the crimes in which the defendant Looser
participated, although one of the judges felt that his sentence
was too severe in vieiT of his resistance.—''^ The defendant Siovers
in Case No,I, 'the Hodical Case, claimed that he took high position
in the Nazi government "so that he could bo close to Himialor and
observe his movements" and so ho could "obtain vital information
which T/ould hasten the day of the overthrow of the Nazi government".
The Tribunal in that case stated with respect tq this clairaed
2/
defense
1/ See pages 13^^1-2, Tr., Case No.X-
2/ See pages 11^86-7, Tr., Case No,I.
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"Assiuning all these things to be true, we cannot
SCO hovf they inay be used as a defense for Sievors.
The fact ronains that Liurders wore corm'.n.tted with
cooperation of the Ahnenerbe against countless
thousands of I'arGtched concentration canp innates
I'iho had not the slightest means of resistance,
Sicvcrs directed the program ty which tliese murders
were committed. It is certainly not the law that a
resistance worker can comit no crmo and least of
all against the very people he is supposed to bo
protecting."
.,COi^CLUSIOH
There is much opportunity for us to go nruch further into
the typical Nazi double talk which has been conceived here to
deceive the unwary. "Te doubt if any other series of trials
have been filled with such circimrventions of truth, such
fantastic explanations and such absurd professions as the
defendants have proffered in Nurnberg, But, in view of the
entire evidence in this case, we think it fitting to conclude
the closing statement in this last trial at Nurnberg with the
same vrords vri.th which Justice Jackson concluded the closing
address for the United States of America in the first trial;
"If you were to say of these men that they are not
guilty, it TiTould be as true to say there has been
no iTar, there are no slain, there has been no crime."
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